Implementing artificial consciousness

Some philosophers argue that conventional silicon-based artificial systems cannot be conscious because they fail to meet certain substantive constraints on how computations are physically implemented. This article challenges those constraints, finding them implausible or poorly supported because they confuse general intuitions about computation with specific intuitions about consciousness. The authors propose that the mechanistic account of computation can better explain the intuitions behind these views while remaining consistent with the possibility of artificial consciousness. Their argument indirectly supports computationalism about consciousness and the idea that conventional artificial systems could be conscious.

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Abstract

Implementationalism maintains that conventional, silicon‐based artificial systems are not conscious because they fail to satisfy certain substantive constraints on computational implementation. In this article, we argue that several recently proposed substantive constraints are implausible, or at least are not well‐supported, insofar as they conflate intuitions about computational implementation generally and consciousness specifically. We argue instead that the mechanistic account of computation can explain several of the intuitions driving implementationalism and non‐computationalism in a manner which is consistent with artificial consciousness. Our argument provides indirect support for computationalism about consciousness and the view that conventional artificial systems can be conscious.