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Benjamin Kozuch

4 papers in the library · 9 citations · publishing 2020-2026

Papers

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Methodological foundations for locating the neural correlates of low-level visual experience.

Frontiers in Psychology 2026 Benjamin Kozuch, Peter Kok

This article presents a framework for identifying the neural correlates of a low-level component of visual consciousness, base experience, defined as the spatial arrangement of colors experienced across the visual field. We propose a content-matching method that compares the content of base experience with that represented by candidate neural systems, treating content matches and mismatches as...

Better bridges: Integrating the neuroscience and philosophy of consciousness.

Consciousness and Cognition November 1, 2024 Benjamin Kozuch 5 citations

Contemporary consciousness research has given rise to numerous theories in both the philosophical and neuroscientific domains (such as higher-order theory and global neuronal workspace), raising the question as to how well each is supported. This article develops a relatively novel method for determining this, which is to use evidence, not just from a theory's own domain, but also from its...

A new low: Reassessing (and revising) the local recurrency theory of consciousness

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science September 22, 2023 Benjamin Kozuch 3 citations

Local Recurrency Theory (LR) holds that recurrent loops of neural activity localized to the visual cortex are necessary and sufficient for visual consciousness (if certain background conditions obtain). LR’s popularity has recently waned in favor of theories holding that higher-level types of processing are necessary for consciousness (e.g., the Global Neuronal Workspace Theory and Higher-order...

Consciousness and Action

The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness July 9, 2020 Benjamin Kozuch 1 citation

In its classical form, epiphenomenalism is the view that conscious mental events have no physical effects: while physical events cause mental events, the opposite is never true. Unlike classical epiphenomenalism, contemporary forms do not hold that conscious mental states always lack causal efficacy, only that they are epiphenomenal relative to certain kinds of action, ones we pre-theoretically...