Underwhelming force: Evaluating the neuropsychological evidence for higher‐order theories of consciousness
Mind & Language November 1, 2022 DOI: 10.1111/mila.12363 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that brain lesion evidence appealed to by higher-order theory proponents fails to support the thesis that mental states are conscious when and only when represented by other mental states, because the kinds of conscious deficit predicted from damage to higher-order state-producing areas do not occur in the cited studies. Proposes an apparatus for evaluating whether other lesion evidence confirms or disconfirms higher-order theory. |
Abstract
Proponents of the higher‐order (HO) theory of consciousness (e.g., Lau and Rosenthal) have recently appealed to brain lesion evidence to support their thesis that mental states are conscious when and only when represented by other mental states. This article argues that this evidence fails to support HO theory, doing this by first determining what kinds of conscious deficit should result when HO state‐producing areas are damaged, then arguing that these kinds of deficit do not occur in the studies to which HO theorists appeal. The article also develops an apparatus that can be used to evaluate whether other lesion evidence confirms or disconfirms HO theory.
Citations in the library
Cited by 12
- Better bridges: Integrating the neuroscience and philosophy of consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition November 1, 2024
- A new low: Reassessing (and revising) the local recurrency theory of consciousness The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science September 22, 2023
- Constructing a Scientific Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness Consciousness as Representing One's Mind July 1, 2025
- Neuroscience undermines the higher-order theorists’ preferred solution to the targetless HOT problem Philosophical Psychology February 15, 2026
- Methodological foundations for locating the neural correlates of low-level visual experience. Frontiers in Psychology 2026
and 7 more in the library
Cites 22
- On a confusion about a function of consciousness Behavioral and Brain Sciences June 1, 1995
- Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences December 1, 2007
- Two neural correlates of consciousness Trends in Cognitive Sciences January 13, 2005
- Are the Neural Correlates of Consciousness in the Front or in the Back of the Cerebral Cortex? Clinical and Neuroimaging Evidence Journal of Neuroscience October 4, 2017
- Phenomenal Consciousness Cambridge University Press eBooks September 28, 2000
and 17 more in the library