Embodied Cognition and Mindreading
Shannon Spaulding
Mind & Language February 1, 2010 DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2009.01383.x (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that mindreading approaches can withstand the strongest arguments from embodied cognition, thereby defending the standard account of human social understanding against challenges to its developmental picture and alleged ubiquity. |
Abstract
Recently, philosophers and psychologists defending the embodied cognition research program have offered arguments against mindreading as a general model of our social understanding. The embodied cognition arguments are of two kinds: those that challenge the developmental picture of mindreading and those that challenge the alleged ubiquity of mindreading. Together, these two kinds of arguments, if successful, would present a serious challenge to the standard account of human social understanding. In this paper, I examine the strongest of these embodied cognition arguments and argue that mindreading approaches can withstand the best of these arguments from embodied cognition.
Citations in the library
Cited by 6
- Direct Social Perception The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition October 9, 2018
- Putting down the revolt: Enactivism as a philosophy of nature. Frontiers in Psychology October 21, 2022
- Searching for the conditions of genuine intersubjectivity The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition October 9, 2018
- Enactivism and neonatal imitation: conceptual and empirical considerations and clarifications. Frontiers in Psychology 2014
- Mixed‐resource modeling meets the philosophy of mind Mind & Language June 16, 2026
and 1 more in the library