The rational role of the perceptual sense of reality

Perceptual experiences often feel as though they directly reveal reality, a quality called phenomenal force. Some philosophers claim this force lets perceptions justify beliefs without inference. This article offers an alternative inferentialist view, drawing on Bayesian cognitive science to argue that the sense of reality in conscious vision can be epistemically evaluated based on its rational origins.

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Abstract

Perceptual experience usually comes with “phenomenal force”, a strong sense that it reflects reality as it is. Some philosophers have argued that it is in virtue of possessing phenomenal force that perceptual experiences are able to non‐inferentially justify beliefs. In this article, I introduce an alternative, inferentialist take on the epistemic role of phenomenal force. Drawing on Bayesian modeling in cognitive science, I argue that the sense of reality that accompanies conscious vision can be viewed as epistemically appraisable in light of its rational etiology.