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The rational role of the perceptual sense of reality

Paweł Gładziejewski

Mind & Language October 19, 2022 DOI: 10.1111/mila.12445 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Keywords Perception Epistemology Virtue Cognitive science Metaphysics Consciousness Cognitive psychology
Citations 4
Key points Argues that the phenomenal force of perceptual experience can be epistemically appraised in light of its rational etiology, drawing on Bayesian modeling in cognitive science.

Abstract

Perceptual experience usually comes with “phenomenal force”, a strong sense that it reflects reality as it is. Some philosophers have argued that it is in virtue of possessing phenomenal force that perceptual experiences are able to non‐inferentially justify beliefs. In this article, I introduce an alternative, inferentialist take on the epistemic role of phenomenal force. Drawing on Bayesian modeling in cognitive science, I argue that the sense of reality that accompanies conscious vision can be viewed as epistemically appraisable in light of its rational etiology.