“All animals are conscious”: Shifting the null hypothesis in consciousness science
Mind & Language January 4, 2024 DOI: 10.1111/mila.12498 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that the marker methodology for answering the distribution question should be rejected because it can imply consciousness in animals many presume unconscious, such as C. elegans, and that a secure theory of consciousness is required instead. Proposes accepting the hypothesis that all animals are conscious to promote theory development, and shifting from asking which animals are conscious to asking how animals are conscious. |
Abstract
The marker approach is taken as best practice for answering the distribution question: Which animals are conscious? However, the methodology can be used to increase confidence in animals many presume to be unconscious, including C. elegans, leading to a trilemma: accept the worms as conscious; reject the specific markers; or reject the marker methodology for answering the distribution question. I defend the third option and argue that answering the distribution question requires a secure theory of consciousness. Accepting the hypothesis all animals are conscious will promote research leading to secure theory, which is needed to create reliable consciousness tests for animals and AIs. Rather than asking the distribution question, we should shift to the dimensions question: How are animals conscious?