Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia
December 1, 2025
Francesco Consiglio
In the contemporary debate in philosophy of mind a major problem has recently emerged about the nature of cognition: do we think just by means of our brain or, rather, our cognition extends outside of the skull? If so, what would “cognition” be? This article aims to focus on this question and to offer a map of the main positions about the Extended Mind Thesis. It firstly offers an introduction...
Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia
December 27, 2024
Edoardo Fugali
This contribution offers a comparison between enactivist cognitive science and classical phenomenology, with a particular focus on key figures such as Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty. Two central issues are explored: the relationship between subject, body, and world, and the mediating role of action within a dynamic conception of cognition. The transcendental perspective emerging from...
Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia
December 27, 2024
Martina Properzi
This article contributes to ongoing research on the minimal self, i.e., the simplest config-uration of individual identity, which is rooted in basic body structures and schemes. The topic of minimal selfhood will be treated from a phenomenological perspective, focusing on issues of technology incorpora-tion. Some types of technology, such as prosthetics, are experienced by the user as part of...
Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia
August 31, 2023
Lisa M. Osbeck, Saulo de Freitas Araujo
We imagine the future of cognitive science by first considering its past, which shows remarkable transformation from a field that, although interdisciplinary, was initially marked by a narrow set of assumptions concerning its subject matter. In the last decades, multiple alternative frameworks with radically different ontological and epistemic commitments (e.g., situated cognition, embodied...
Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia
August 31, 2023
Aurora Alegiani, Massimo Marraffa, Tiziana Vistarini
In this paper we carve out a reformist agenda within the debate on the foundations of cognitive science, incorporating some important ideas from the 4E cognition literature into the computational-representational framework. We are deeply sympathetic to this reformist program since we think that, despite strong criticism of the concept of computation and the related notion of representation,...
Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia
August 31, 2022
Stefano Vincini, Valentina Fantasia
3 citations
In philosophy and cognitive science, the tension between cognitivism and the 4E-Cognition approach is both deep and polarizing. A lack of serious engagement with the theoretical and empirical work generated by the opposing framework seems problematic on both sides. In this paper, we closely discuss data on early socio-cognitive development produced by an influential nativist current of thought...
Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia
December 31, 2021
Riccardo Manzotti
1 citation
In this paper I approach the problem of the boundaries and location of consciousness in a strictly physicalist way. I start with the debate on extended cognition, pointing to two unresolved issues: the ontological status of cognition and the fallacy of the center. I then propose using identity to single out the physical basis of consciousness. As a tentative solution, I consider Mind-Object...
Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia
December 31, 2021
Alfonso Lanzieri
In this article we contrast Henri Bergson’s mind-body theory with the latest developments in Philosophy of Mind, more specifically, in so-called “Externalism”. This paper has two specific aims. First, we argue that the work of this French philosopher anticipated the main theoretical concepts of Externalism. Indeed, Bergson’s theory of perception shares many important features, which have not...
Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia
December 31, 2021
Giovanni Tuzet, Andrea Lavazza
In the theory of documentality, social objects are understood as inscribed acts; in extended mind theory, minds are considered to extend beyond the body to external processes and devices. Although for different reasons, these two theories rely on the semiotic dimension to reduce the differences between minds and documents. Yet, in a certain reading, such theories are implausible if we consider...
Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia
May 2, 2021
4 citations
The article outlines some similarities between the perspectives adopted by Shaun Gallagher and William James. In particular, assuming that the issue of representation in cognitive systems provides a valuable starting point and testing ground for verifying James’ possible contribution to enactivism, we argue that there is a considerable degree of similarity between Gallagher’s and James’...
Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia
December 31, 2020
Felice Cimatti
According to the extended mind thesis, the human mind is not limited by the boundaries of the body. In this paper, we propose a description of human emotions based on two distinct theories, not usually considered together: Vygotsky’s historical-cultural psychology and Chomsky’s theory of language. Together these two perspectives allow us to construct a global theory of extended mind that...
Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia
September 3, 2020
Gianfranco Pellegrino, Mirko Daniel Garasic
Artificial intelligences and robots increasingly mimic human mental powers and intelligent behaviour. However, many authors claim that ascribing human mental powers to them is both conceptually mistaken and morally dangerous. This article defends the view that artificial intelligences can have human-like mental powers, by claiming that both human and artificial minds can be seen as extended...
Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia
August 31, 2019
Elisa Magrì
5 citations
This paper aims to situate the roles of attention and habit in contemporary approaches to embodied cognition with particular regard to the conceptualisation of affordances. While Chemero has argued that affordances have a relational character that rules out dispositions, Rietveld and Kiverstein have suggested that engaging with affordances amounts to exercising skills. By critically...
Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia
January 3, 2019
Federico Zilio
Despite the theoretical and epistemological complexities involved in dealing with the phenomenon of consciousness, the author describes defines a pragmatic and experimental methodology, based on a two-dimensional neurocognitive approach. Indeed, in order to avoid the hard problem of consciousness, it would be better to focus on the real problem, i.e. on mechanisms that can be empirically...
Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia
September 1, 2018
Marco Sanna
This paper aims at showing the heuristic value of several semiotic models in scientific research, and in particular the neurosciences. In Greimas and Lotman’s theories, for example, we find effective and operationalized instruments that could help us address some of the most difficult problems related to the mind, consciousness, and the origin of semiosis and languages. In this way, certain...
Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia
September 1, 2018
Andrea Togni
In this paper, I discuss some methodological issues relevant to the debate on the individuation of the sensory modalities. First, I make a distinction between a metaphysical question related to the nature of the senses, and a classificatory question related to their taxonomization. The criteria commonly used to individuate the senses should be able to address both questions. Second, I...
Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia
August 6, 2016
Marco Viola
This article aims at providing a rational reconstruction of the ontology of Cognitive Neuroscience. That should satisfy three desiderata: (a) an ontology of cognitive functions describing any operation of the mind; (b) an ontology of neural structure describing any part of the brain; (c) a one-to-one correspondence between each cognitive function and a given neural structure. The assumptions...
Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia
May 1, 2016
Alfredo Tomasetta
Current philosophical and scientific approaches to consciousness are very often characterised by a strong background presupposition: whatever the precise details of a theory of consciousness may be, a physicalist – or materialist – view of consciousness itself must be correct. I believe, however, that this conviction, pervasive though it may be, is not really justified. In particular, I think...
Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia
May 1, 2016
Mariaflavia Cascelli
First Person Dilemma and the Phenomenology of Action: How Minimal is Self-consciousness? - In recent years, increasing attention has been given to the possibility that a minimal, pre-reflective form of self-consciousness precedes introspective self-consciousness. Several attempts to argue that this “thin” notion of self-consciousness is a necessary prerequisite of consciousness have been...
Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia
May 1, 2016
Giulia Piredda
The Extended Mind Hypothesis: An Anthropology of Natural Cyborgs - The “extended mind” framework depicts humans as natural-born cyborgs equipped with supersized minds, thanks to their ability to exploit technological and environmental resources in special and integrated ways. In this paper, the historical background of the extended mind model will be outlined – starting with the criticisms to...
Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia
May 1, 2016
Riccardo Manzotti
Traditional mind-body identity theories maintain that consciousness is identical with neural activity. Consider an alternative identity theory – namely, a mind-object identity theory of consciousness (OBJECTBOUND). I suggest to take into consideration whether one’s consciousness might be identical with the external object. The hypothesis is that, when I perceive a yellow banana, the thing that...
Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia
December 28, 2015
Reza Maleeh, Achim Stephan
In this paper, we propose three lines of argumentation against Nannini’s eliminativist approach towards consciousness and the Self. First, we argue that the premises he uses to argue for eliminativism can equally well be used to draw a completely different conclusion in favor of naturalistic dualism according to which phenomenal consciousness irreducibly emerges from a physical substrate by...
Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia
December 28, 2015
Gregor Michael Hoerzer
According to Sandro Nannini’s Time and Consciousness in Cognitive Naturalism, we can draw an analogy between the shift in the conception of time that occurred in physics with the introduction of relativity theory and a shift towards a scientifically more graspable functional concept of phenomenal consciousness. This analogy is meant to persuade us of the eliminative materialist view that we...
Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia
September 11, 2015
Michela Summa, Thomas Fuchs
13 citations
This paper develops a phenomenological analysis of the disturbances of self-experience in dementia. After considering the lack of conceptual clarity regarding the notions of self and person in current research on dementia, we develop a phenomenological theory of the structure of self-experience in the first section. Within this complex structure, we distinguish between the basic level of...
Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia
September 11, 2015
Riccardo Williams
In this paper, two main aspects of Cristina Meini’s From Cradle to Internet. The Social Nature of Personal Identity are taken into consideration. In the first place, Meini’s argument concerning the structuring role for self development of caregivers’ communicative mirroring is analysed in the light of current literature concerning the multi-layered architecture of identity. I propose to...