The extended mind hypothesis portrays humans as natural-born cyborgs whose minds are enlarged through the integrated use of technological and environmental resources. This paper outlines the historical background of the model, starting with criticisms of classical cognitive science and methodological individualism. It presents and discusses the main philosophical argument for extended mind, based on the plausibility of extended dispositional belief. Problematic aspects are considered, including the problem of criteria, the causal-constitution fallacy, and the mark of the cognitive. The conclusion is that, despite several theoretical difficulties, the model's main advantage is proposing a vision of the human mind in which biology, culture, and technology are integrated.
The paper examines the relationship between the empirical subject of psychology and the pure subject of phenomenology, arguing that despite their closeness, phenomenological analysis does not embrace naturalistic presuppositions. It contrasts two contemporary approaches to consciousness: an embodied view that expects neuroscience to fully explain psychical phenomena, leading toward a mathematized psyche through complexity sciences, and a phenomenological approach grounded in Husserl's concept of hyle, which sees subjectivity as bound to sensory experience. The latter finds support in neuroscience's advancements, while the former seeks scientific status through formalization.
John Searle claims to have solved the mind-brain problem, particularly regarding consciousness, through his theory of biological naturalism. This paper examines Searle's theory from its 1980s origins to his latest works. The analysis reveals that biological naturalism contains numerous theoretical difficulties and logical inconsistencies, disqualifying it as a valid explanation for consciousness and the mind-brain relationship. Rather than solving the problem of consciousness, Searle has instead created a new mystery around it.