Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia
December 28, 2015
Gregor Michael Hoerzer
According to Sandro Nannini’s Time and Consciousness in Cognitive Naturalism, we can draw an analogy between the shift in the conception of time that occurred in physics with the introduction of relativity theory and a shift towards a scientifically more graspable functional concept of phenomenal consciousness. This analogy is meant to persuade us of the eliminative materialist view that we...
Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia
December 1, 2015
Michele Di Francesco, Alfredo Tomasetta
This commentary focuses on three aspects of Sandro Nannini's paper Time and Consciusness in Cognitive Naturalism: (1) the parallel between Einstein's theory of relativity and the new science of the mind/brain; (2) the Cartesian characterization of non-reductionist positions in the philosophy of mind;(3) the alleged illusory status of consciousness, free will and the Self.We suggest, first, that...
Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia
September 11, 2015
Michela Summa, Thomas Fuchs
13 citations
This paper develops a phenomenological analysis of the disturbances of self-experience in dementia. After considering the lack of conceptual clarity regarding the notions of self and person in current research on dementia, we develop a phenomenological theory of the structure of self-experience in the first section. Within this complex structure, we distinguish between the basic level of...
Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia
September 11, 2015
Riccardo Williams
In this paper, two main aspects of Cristina Meini’s From Cradle to Internet. The Social Nature of Personal Identity are taken into consideration. In the first place, Meini’s argument concerning the structuring role for self development of caregivers’ communicative mirroring is analysed in the light of current literature concerning the multi-layered architecture of identity. I propose to...
Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia
December 29, 2014
Federica Buongiorno
“First” and “Third” Person Phenomenology: Searle and Dennett Critics of Husserl - In this paper I compare Searle’s and Dennett’s philosophies of mind with Husserl’s theory of consciousness. My aim is to show how they modified the phenomenological concept of intentionality turning it into a “third-person” model of description. This change leads to problematic consequences concerning mainly (i)...
Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia
August 31, 2014
Gaetano Fiorin, Denis Delfitto
4 citations
In his work on attitudes de se, James Higginbotham has observed that the silent subject of the infinitival complements of verbs such as remember and imagine is (i) unambiguously de se and (ii) immune to error through misidentification relatively to the subject of the matrix clause. In this article, we review and criticize Higginbotham’s reflexive analysis of these infinitival complements. We...
Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia
September 2, 2013
Graziella Morselli
Phenomenology, Psychology, and Embodiment. Reflections on Edmund Husserl’s Philosophy as a Rigorous Science – The empirical subject psychologists investigate is closely related to the pure subject phenomenologists work on. Because of this, one could think that phenomenological analysis embraces naturalistic presuppositions, even though Husserl decidedly rejected this idea and argued, on the...
Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia
June 29, 2013
Sergio Salvatore, Pier Paolo Tarsi
1 citation
This paper proposes a phenomenologically oriented theoretical perspective and it aims at showing that intersubjectivity and its dynamics of sense-making are consistent with an emergentist view of the personal Self. In particular, this paper proposes a semiotic model of mind and a correlated conception of the self as a “hyper-generalized sign”. The starting point for this analysis is based on...
Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia
June 29, 2013
Saulo de Freitas Araujo
John Searle repeatedly claims to have offered a solution to the mind-brain problem, especially as regards the mystery of consciousness. The aim of this paper is to present and analyse Searle’s theory of biological naturalism, from its earliest expression in the 1980s to his most recent works. Our analysis shows that Searle’s biological naturalism suffers from many theoretical difficulties and...
Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia
2012
Maria Armezzani
Riassunto: Il progetto husserliano mira a fondare una scienza rigorosa dell’esperienza e le linee guida di questo lavoro si intravedono già nel suo manifesto fenomenologico del 1911. Questo progetto prende la psicologia come proprio element focale e nello specifico, Husserl tenta di salvarla dalla tentazioni del naturalismo per ripristinare il suo vero compito: una analisi rigorosa dei fenomeni...