The Several Factors of (Self-)Consciousness
Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia December 1, 2016 DOI: 10.4453/rifp.2016.0032 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 3 |
| Key points | Argues that a "modal model" of (self-) consciousness factors a typical conscious act into several distinct forms of awareness, and that phenomenality should be distinguished from other features of experience: "what it is like" to have an experience involves several different factors. The author proposes these factors are typical rather than essential features of consciousness, allowing that some elements of awareness may be absent while others are present in less typical cases. |
Abstract
In prior essays I have sketched a “modal model” of (self-) consciousness. That model “factors” out several distinct forms of awareness in the phenomenological structure of a typical act of consciousness. Here we consider implications of the model à propos of contemporary theories of consciousness (e.g. higher-order and self-representational forms of awareness). In particular, we distinguish phenomenality from other features of awareness in a conscious experience: “what it is like” to have an experience involves several different factors. Further, we should see these factors as typical of consciousness, rather than essential features, allowing that some elements of awareness may be absent while others are present in certain less typical cases.