Artificial intelligences as extended minds. Why not?
Gianfranco Pellegrino, Mirko Daniel Garasic
Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia September 3, 2020 DOI: 10.4453/rifp.2020.0010 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Artificial intelligence Mind Moral responsibility |
| Key points | Argues that the Extended Mind Model can be applied to artificial intelligences, supporting the conclusion that they possess minds and may be considered morally responsible agents. |
Abstract
Artificial intelligences and robots increasingly mimic human mental powers and intelligent behaviour. However, many authors claim that ascribing human mental powers to them is both conceptually mistaken and morally dangerous. This article defends the view that artificial intelligences can have human-like mental powers, by claiming that both human and artificial minds can be seen as extended minds – along the lines of Chalmers and Clark’s view of mind and cognition. The main idea of this article is that the Extended Mind Model is independently plausible and can easily be extended to artificial intelligences, providing a solid base for concluding that artificial intelligences possess minds. This may warrant viewing them as morally responsible agents.