Le menti non sono documenti (e viceversa)
Giovanni Tuzet, Andrea Lavazza
Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia December 31, 2021 DOI: 10.4453/rifp.2021.0021 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Law Documents Extended mind Externalism Social objects Social ontology Maurizio ferraris |
| Key points | Argues that documentality and extended mind theories are implausible because the properties of minds and documents are not identical, challenging the thesis that moderate externalism can undermine strong externalism. |
Abstract
In the theory of documentality, social objects are understood as inscribed acts; in extended mind theory, minds are considered to extend beyond the body to external processes and devices. Although for different reasons, these two theories rely on the semiotic dimension to reduce the differences between minds and documents. Yet, in a certain reading, such theories are implausible if we consider that the properties of the things we call “minds” are not identical to the properties of the things we call “documents” (just as, on the other hand, the properties of social objects are not identical to the properties of the acts that constitute them). This calls into question a common thesis implicit in both theories: that moderate or interactionist externalism can be used to challenge strong externalism.