Knowledge by Experience. Or Why Physicalism Should not be our Default Position in Consciousness Studies
Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia May 1, 2016 DOI: 10.4453/rifp.2016.0004 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Keywords | Consciousness Physicalism Knowledge Nature/essence Common sense |
| Key points | Argues that there is a strong prima facie case for rejecting physicalism regarding phenomenal consciousness, based on common-sense reasoning. |
Abstract
Current philosophical and scientific approaches to consciousness are very often characterised by a strong background presupposition: whatever the precise details of a theory of consciousness may be, a physicalist – or materialist – view of consciousness itself must be correct. I believe, however, that this conviction, pervasive though it may be, is not really justified. In particular, I think (1) that the arguments offered in favour of the materialist presupposition are weak and unconvincing, and (2) that there is a very strong prima facie case for rejecting physicalism regarding phenomenal consciousness. In a previous article of mine I have already discussed the first point; the present paper is devoted to elaborating the second, presenting a common-sense-based argument against physicalism.