Fenomenologia trascendentale e cognizione incarnata. La relazione tra soggetto, corpo e mondo nel quadro di un’ontologia naturale riformata
Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia December 27, 2024 DOI: 10.4453/rifp.2024.0021 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Qualitative Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Keywords | Embodied cognition Enactivism Perception Subjectivity |
| Key points | Argues that enactivist cognitive science and classical phenomenology together support a view of cognition as continuous with embodied action, challenging mind-body dualism and physicalist naturalism. |
Abstract
This contribution offers a comparison between enactivist cognitive science and classical phenomenology, with a particular focus on key figures such as Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty. Two central issues are explored: the relationship between subject, body, and world, and the mediating role of action within a dynamic conception of cognition. The transcendental perspective emerging from incarnate subjectivity emphasizes the continuity between action, perception, and higher cognitive functions, challenging the mind-body duality in favor of a unified and continuous phenomenological experience. The second issue addresses physicalist naturalism and the need to move beyond mechanistic assumptions, proposing a weak naturalism that remains compatible with a transcendental perspective, one that grounds subjectivity in an embodied biological organism. An ontology of nature, inspired by Merleau-Ponty, is explored, emphasizing the qualitative aspects of the “flesh” and overcoming the limitations inherent in Husserl’s approach.