The future of cognitive science is pluralistic, but what does that mean?

This paper examines the past and future of cognitive science, noting its transformation from an interdisciplinary field with narrow assumptions to one embracing alternative frameworks like situated cognition, embodied cognition, and extended mind. The authors consider three logical alternatives for understanding these changes: newer approaches are not properly cognitive, they are cognitive but not science, or cognitive science has become pluralistic. They endorse the third position and argue that the future of cognitive science will be pluralistic. Clarifying the polysemous term 'pluralism,' they distinguish ontological, epistemic, and ethical forms, and explore what each might imply for the field's future.

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Abstract

We imagine the future of cognitive science by first considering its past, which shows remarkable transformation from a field that, although interdisciplinary, was initially marked by a narrow set of assumptions concerning its subject matter. In the last decades, multiple alternative frameworks with radically different ontological and epistemic commitments (e.g., situated cognition, embodied cognition, extended mind) found broad support. We address the question of how to understand these changes, noting as logical alternatives that (1) newer approaches are not properly cognitive; (2) that newer approaches are cognitive but not science; and (3) that cognitive science has become pluralistic. We endorse the third position and venture to guess that the future of cognitive science is also pluralistic. We are left, however, with the question of what this means. After noting the polysemous nature of the term “pluralism”, we attempt to add clarity by distinguishing three forms: ontological, epistemic, and ethical. We then consider what each form might imply for the future of cognitive science.