Experiences are Objects. Towards a Mind-object Identity Theory
Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia May 1, 2016 DOI: 10.4453/rifp.2016.0003 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Identity theory Mind/body problem Consciousness Hallucinations Illusions |
| Key points | Proposes that one's conscious experience of an object is identical with the object itself, rather than with neural processes. |
Abstract
Traditional mind-body identity theories maintain that consciousness is identical with neural activity. Consider an alternative identity theory – namely, a mind-object identity theory of consciousness (OBJECTBOUND). I suggest to take into consideration whether one’s consciousness might be identical with the external object. The hypothesis is that, when I perceive a yellow banana, the thing that is one and the same with my consciousness of the yellow banana is the very yellow banana one can grab and eat, rather than the neural processes triggered by the banana. The bottom line is that one’s conscious experience of an object is the object one experiences. First, I outline the main hypothesis and the relation between mind, body, and object. Eventually, I address a series of traditional obstacles such as hallucinations, illusions, and commonsensical assumptions.