Experiences are Objects. Towards a Mind-object Identity Theory

A philosophical paper proposes an alternative identity theory of consciousness called OBJECTBOUND, which suggests that consciousness of an external object is identical with that object itself, not with neural activity. When perceiving a yellow banana, the conscious experience of the banana is one and the same as the physical banana that can be grabbed and eaten. The author outlines this hypothesis and examines the relationship between mind, body, and object, then addresses traditional objections involving hallucinations, illusions, and commonsense assumptions.

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Abstract

Traditional mind-body identity theories maintain that consciousness is identical with neural activity. Consider an alternative identity theory – namely, a mind-object identity theory of consciousness (OBJECTBOUND). I suggest to take into consideration whether one’s consciousness might be identical with the external object. The hypothesis is that, when I perceive a yellow banana, the thing that is one and the same with my consciousness of the yellow banana is the very yellow banana one can grab and eat, rather than the neural processes triggered by the banana. The bottom line is that one’s conscious experience of an object is the object one experiences. First, I outline the main hypothesis and the relation between mind, body, and object. Eventually, I address a series of traditional obstacles such as hallucinations, illusions, and commonsensical assumptions.