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Neuroscience of Consciousness

ISSN 2057-2107

230 papers in the library · 2,964 citations · publishing 2015-2026

Papers

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Integrating information in the brain's EM field: the cemi field theory of consciousness.

Neuroscience of Consciousness 2020 Johnjoe Mcfadden 152 citations

A key aspect of consciousness is that it represents bound or integrated information, prompting an increasing conviction that the physical substrate of consciousness must be capable of encoding integrated information in the brain. However, as Ralph Landauer insisted, 'information is physical' so integrated information must be physically integrated. I argue here that nearly all examples of...

DOI: 10.1093/nc/niaa016 (opens in new tab) Full text (opens in new tab) Cemi field theory Computing Consciousness Electromagnetic field +2

The Dream Catcher experiment: blinded analyses failed to detect markers of dreaming consciousness in EEG spectral power.

Neuroscience of Consciousness 2020 William Wong, Valdas Noreika, Levente Móró et al. 35 citations

The Dream Catcher test defines the criteria for a genuine discovery of the neural constituents of phenomenal consciousness. Passing the test implies that some patterns of purely brain-based data directly correspond to the subjective features of phenomenal experience, which would help to bridge the explanatory gap between consciousness and brain. Here, we conducted the Dream Catcher test for the...

DOI: 10.1093/nc/niaa006 (opens in new tab) Full text (opens in new tab) EEG Correlates Nrem sleep Dreams Unconsciousness +1

Neural network models for DMT-induced visual hallucinations

Neuroscience of Consciousness 2020 Michael Schartner, Christopher Timmermann 17 citations

Abstract The regulatory role of the serotonergic system on conscious perception can be investigated perturbatorily with psychedelic drugs such as N,N-Dimethyltryptamine. There is increasing evidence that the serotonergic system gates prior (endogenous) and sensory (exogenous) information in the construction of a conscious experience. Using two generative deep neural networks as examples, we...

DOI: 10.1093/nc/niaa024 (opens in new tab) Full text (opens in new tab) Serotonergic Visual hallucination Cognitive psychology Sensory system +3

Spotlight commentary: REBUS and the anarchic brain.

Neuroscience of Consciousness 2020 Tehseen Noorani, Ben Alderson-Day 8 citations

In 'REBUS and the Anarchic Brain: Towards a Unified Model of the Brain Action of Psychedelics', Carhart-Harris and Friston offer an important analysis of what the predictive processing framework has to offer our understanding of psychedelic experiences, providing an invaluable ground for psychedelic psychiatry. While applauding this, we encourage paying greater attention to contextual factors...

A new experimental phenomenological method to explore the subjective features of psychological phenomena: its application to binocular rivalry

Neuroscience of Consciousness 2020 Takuya Niikawa, Katsunori Miyahara, Hiro Taiyo Hamada et al. 3 citations

Abstract The subjective features of psychological phenomena have been studied intensively in experimental science in recent years. Although various methods have been proposed to identify subjective features of psychological phenomena, there are elusive subjective features such as the spatiotemporal structure of experience, which are difficult to capture without some additional methodological...

DOI: 10.1093/nc/niaa018 (opens in new tab) Full text (opens in new tab) Phenomenology philosophy Binocular rivalry Cognitive psychology Phenomenological method +2

Measures of agency.

Neuroscience of Consciousness 2020 Thor Grünbaum, Mark Schram Christensen

The sense of agency is typically defined as the experience of controlling one's own actions, and through them, changes in the external environment. It is often assumed that this experience is a single, unified construct that can be experimentally manipulated and measured in a variety of ways. In this article, we challenge this assumption. We argue that we should acknowledge four possible...

DOI: 10.1093/nc/niaa019 (opens in new tab) Full text (opens in new tab) Consciousness Construct validity Intention Methodology +3

The multi-dimensional approach to drug-induced states: A commentary on Bayne and Carter’s “dimensions of consciousness and the psychedelic state”

Neuroscience of Consciousness 2020 Martin Fortier-Davy, Raphaël Millière

Abstract Bayne and Carter argue that the mode of consciousness induced by psychedelic drugs does not fit squarely within the traditional account of modes as levels of consciousness, and favors instead a multi-dimensional account according to which modes of consciousness differ along several dimensions—none of which warrants a linear ordering of modes. We discuss the assumption that psychedelic...

High-voltage, diffuse delta rhythms coincide with wakeful consciousness and complexity in Angelman syndrome

Neuroscience of Consciousness 2020 Joel Frohlich, Lynne M. Bird, John Dell’italia et al.

Abstract: Abundant evidence from slow wave sleep, anesthesia, coma, and epileptic seizures links high-voltage, slow electroencephalogram (EEG) activity to loss of consciousness. This well-established correlation is challenged by the observation that children with Angelman syndrome (AS), while fully awake and displaying volitional behavior, display a hypersynchronous delta (1–4 Hz) frequency EEG...

What binds us? Inter-brain neural synchronization and its implications for theories of human consciousness

Neuroscience of Consciousness 2020 A. Valencia, Tom Froese

Abstract The association between neural oscillations and functional integration is widely recognized in the study of human cognition. Large-scale synchronization of neural activity has also been proposed as the neural basis of consciousness. Intriguingly, a growing number of studies in social cognitive neuroscience reveal that phase synchronization similarly appears across brains during...

A multiple-response frequency-tagging paradigm measures graded changes in consciousness during perceptual filling-in.

Neuroscience of Consciousness 2020 Matthew J Davidson, Irene L Graafsma, Naotsugu Tsuchiya et al.

Perceptual filling-in (PFI) occurs when a physically present visual target disappears from conscious perception, with its location filled-in by the surrounding visual background. These perceptual changes are complete, near instantaneous, and can occur for multiple separate locations simultaneously. Here, we show that contrasting neural activity during the presence or absence of multi-target PFI...

DOI: 10.1093/nc/niaa002 (opens in new tab) Full text (opens in new tab) Contents of consciousness Methodology Perception Psychophysics

How experimental neuroscientists can fix the hard problem of consciousness.

Neuroscience of Consciousness 2020 Colin Klein, Andrew B Barron

For the materialist, the hard problem is fundamentally an explanatory problem. Solving it requires explaining why the relationship between brain and experience is the way it is and not some other way. We use the tools of the interventionist theory of explanation to show how a systematic experimental project could help move beyond the hard problem. Key to this project is the development of...

A systematic investigation of the association between network dynamics in the human brain and the state of consciousness

Neuroscience of Consciousness 2020 J. Crone, E. Lutkenhoff, P. Vespa et al.

Abstract An increasing amount of studies suggest that brain dynamics measured with resting-state functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) are related to the state of consciousness. However, the challenge of investigating neuronal correlates of consciousness is the confounding interference between (recovery of) consciousness and behavioral responsiveness. To address this issue, and validate...

Defending subjective inflation: an inference to the best explanation.

Neuroscience of Consciousness 2020 JD Knotts, Matthias Michel, Brian Odegaard

In a recent opinion piece, Abid (2019) criticizes the hypothesis that subjective inflation may partly account for apparent phenomenological richness across the visual field and outside the focus of attention. In response, we address three main issues. First, we maintain that inflation should be interpreted as an intraperceptual-and not post-perceptual-phenomenon. Second, we describe how...

DOI: 10.1093/nc/niaa025 (opens in new tab) Full text (opens in new tab) Consciousness Filling-in Perceptual confidence Signal detection theory +1

The science of consciousness does not need another theory, it needs a minimal unifying model

Neuroscience of Consciousness 2020 Wanja Wiese

Abstract This article discusses a hypothesis recently put forward by Kanai et al., according to which information generation constitutes a functional basis of, and a sufficient condition for, consciousness. Information generation involves the ability to compress and subsequently decompress information, potentially after a temporal delay and adapted to current purposes. I will argue that...

Editorial: Open science in consciousness research

Neuroscience of Consciousness December 13, 2019 Anil K. Seth, Jakob Hohwy

All of us involved in the mind and brain sciences, in whatever capacity, are increasingly aware of the importance of ensuring the credibility of our research. This credibility—which for experimental work turns on its reliability—is particularly salient for consciousness research, given the at-times precarious perception of consciousness science within the wider landscapes of psychology and...

Psychedelics as a treatment for disorders of consciousness

Neuroscience of Consciousness 2019 Gregory Scott, Robin Carhart-Harris 72 citations

Based on its ability to increase brain complexity, a seemingly reliable index of conscious level, we propose testing the capacity of the classic psychedelic, psilocybin, to increase conscious awareness in patients with disorders of consciousness. We also confront the considerable ethical and practical challenges this proposal must address, if this hypothesis is to be directly assessed.

DOI: 10.1093/nc/niz003 (opens in new tab) Full text (opens in new tab) Psilocybin Persistent vegetative state Level of consciousness Cognitive psychology +2

The ethics of psychedelic research in disorders of consciousness

Neuroscience of Consciousness 2019 Andrew Peterson, Enzo Tagliazucchi, Charles Weijer 25 citations

This article provides an ethical analysis of psychedelic research involving disorders of consciousness patients. We apply two internationally accepted approaches for analyzing the ethics of human research, the Value-Validity Framework and Component Analysis, to a research program recently proposed by Scott and Carhart-Harris. We focus on Scott and Carhart-Harris's proposal, but the ethical...

Memories of near-death experiences: are they self-defining?

Neuroscience of Consciousness 2019 Héléna Cassol, Arnaud D’Argembeau, Vanessa Charland-Verville et al. 16 citations

Some people report memories of near-death experiences (NDEs) after facing situations of impending death and these memories appear to have significant consequences on their lives (here referred to as “real NDE experiencers”; real NDErs). We assessed to what extent NDE memories are considered self-defining: memories that help people to define clearly how they see themselves. We screened 71...

DOI: 10.1093/nc/niz002 (opens in new tab) Full text (opens in new tab) Centrality Identity music Scale ratio Autobiographical memory +4

Can a microdynamic approach to sleep-onset imagery solve the overabundance problem of dreaming? Commentary on Tore Nielsen's "Microdream neurophenomenology".

Neuroscience of Consciousness 2019 Jennifer Windt 8 citations

Nielsen proposes that a microdynamic approach to experiences occurring in the earliest stages of sleep onset, which he calls microdreams, can shed light on the process of dream imagery formation. I discuss microdreams in the context of simulation views, in which dreaming is defined as the immersive experience of a virtual world centered on a virtual self. I also evaluate his proposal to expand...

Building perception block by block: a response to Fekete et al.

Neuroscience of Consciousness 2019 Adrien Doerig, Frank Scharnowski, Michael H Herzog

Is consciousness a continuous stream, or do percepts occur only at certain moments of time? This age-old question is still under debate. Both positions face difficult problems, which we proposed to overcome with a 2-stage model, where unconscious processing continuously integrates information before a discrete, conscious percept occurs. Recently, Fekete et al. criticized our model. Here, we...

Exploring the role of expectations and stimulus relevance on stimulus-specific neural representations and conscious report.

Neuroscience of Consciousness 2019 Erik L Meijs, Pim Mostert, Heleen A. Slagter et al.

Subjective experience can be influenced by top-down factors, such as expectations and stimulus relevance. Recently, it has been shown that expectations can enhance the likelihood that a stimulus is consciously reported, but the neural mechanisms supporting this enhancement are still unclear. We manipulated stimulus expectations within the attentional blink (AB) paradigm using letters and...

DOI: 10.1093/nc/niz011 (opens in new tab) Full text (opens in new tab) Attentional blink Consciousness Decoding Expectation +2

Information generation as a functional basis of consciousness.

Neuroscience of Consciousness 2019 Ryota Kanai, Acer Y. C. Chang, Yen Yu et al.

What is the biological advantage of having consciousness? Functions of consciousness have been elusive due to the subjective nature of consciousness and ample empirical evidence showing the presence of many nonconscious cognitive performances in the human brain. Drawing upon empirical literature, here, we propose that a core function of consciousness be the ability to internally generate...

DOI: 10.1093/nc/niz016 (opens in new tab) Full text (opens in new tab) Computational modeling Consciousness Imagery Qualia +1

Dimensions of consciousness and the psychedelic state

Neuroscience of Consciousness 2018 Tim Bayne, Olivia Carter 153 citations

It has often been suggested in the popular and academic literature that the psychedelic state qualifies as a higher state of consciousness relative to the state of normal waking awareness. This article subjects this proposal to critical scrutiny, focusing on the question of what it would mean for a state of consciousness to be 'higher'. We begin by considering the contrast between conscious...

DOI: 10.1093/nc/niy008 (opens in new tab) Full text (opens in new tab) Psilocybin Altered state Perception Cognitive psychology +2

In the interest of saving time: a critique of discrete perception

Neuroscience of Consciousness 2018 Tomer Fekete, Sander van de Cruys, Vebjørn Ekroll et al. 40 citations

A recently proposed model of sensory processing suggests that perceptual experience is updated in discrete steps. We show that the data advanced to support discrete perception are in fact compatible with a continuous account of perception. Physiological and psychophysical constraints, moreover, as well as our awake-primate imaging data, imply that human neuronal networks cannot support discrete...

DOI: 10.1093/nc/niy003 (opens in new tab) Full text (opens in new tab) Perception Phenomenology philosophy Cognitive psychology Consciousness +3

The Sussex-Waterloo Scale of Hypnotizability (SWASH): measuring capacity for altering conscious experience.

Neuroscience of Consciousness 2018 Peter Lush, G Moga, N McLatchie et al.

The ability to respond to hypnotic suggestibility (hypnotizability) is a stable trait which can be measured in a standardized procedure consisting of a hypnotic induction and a series of hypnotic suggestions. The SWASH is a 10-item adaptation of an established scale, the Waterloo-Stanford Group C Scale of Hypnotic Suggestibility (WSGC). Development of the SWASH was motivated by three distinct...

DOI: 10.1093/nc/niy006 (opens in new tab) Full text (opens in new tab) Agency Contents of consciousness Hypnosis Intention +1