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Measures of agency.

Thor Grünbaum, Mark Schram Christensen

Neuroscience of Consciousness 2020 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niaa019 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Keywords Consciousness Construct validity Intention Methodology Sense of agency Theories and models Volition
Key points Argues that the sense of agency is not a single unified construct but should be understood as four possible agency-related psychological constructs, and that the mismatch between these constructs and the experimental procedures used to study them is a major theoretical and methodological obstacle. Proposes that recognizing this obstacle is necessary for designing paradigms that can investigate the responsible computational mechanisms.

Abstract

The sense of agency is typically defined as the experience of controlling one's own actions, and through them, changes in the external environment. It is often assumed that this experience is a single, unified construct that can be experimentally manipulated and measured in a variety of ways. In this article, we challenge this assumption. We argue that we should acknowledge four possible agency-related psychological constructs. Having a clear grasp of the possible constructs is important since experimental procedures are only able to target some but not all the possible constructs. The unacknowledged misalignment of the possible constructs of a sense of agency and the experimental procedures is a major theoretical and methodological obstacle to studying the sense of agency. Only if we recognize the nature of this obstacle will we be able to design the experimental paradigms that would enable us to study the responsible computational mechanisms.

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