The science of consciousness does not need another theory, it needs a minimal unifying model

This article argues that information generation, the ability to compress and later decompress information adapted to current purposes, should not be considered a sufficient condition for consciousness but can serve as a "minimal unifying model of consciousness" (MUM). A MUM specifies at least one necessary feature of consciousness, characterizes it in a determinable way, and shows it is entailed by many existing theories. The author contends that such a model is useful because it unifies theories by highlighting common assumptions while enabling further developments and empirical predictions. Unlike more specific theories that likely contain false assumptions, a MUM is probably adequate at a general level, functioning as guiding principles that allow refinements and more specific claims.

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Abstract

Abstract This article discusses a hypothesis recently put forward by Kanai et al., according to which information generation constitutes a functional basis of, and a sufficient condition for, consciousness. Information generation involves the ability to compress and subsequently decompress information, potentially after a temporal delay and adapted to current purposes. I will argue that information generation should not be regarded as a sufficient condition for consciousness, but could serve as what I will call a “minimal unifying model of consciousness.” A minimal unifying model (MUM) specifies at least one necessary feature of consciousness, characterizes it in a determinable way, and shows that it is entailed by (many) existing theories of consciousness. Information generation fulfills these requirements. A MUM of consciousness is useful, because it unifies existing theories of consciousness by highlighting their common assumptions, while enabling further developments from which empirical predictions can be derived. Unlike existing theories (which probably contain at least some false assumptions), a MUM is thus likely to be an adequate model of consciousness, albeit at a relatively general level. Assumptions embodied in such a model are less informative than assumptions made by more specific theories and hence function more in the way of guiding principles. Still, they enable further refinements, in line with new empirical results and broader theoretical and evolutionary considerations. This also allows developing the model in ways that facilitate more specific claims and predictions.