In the interest of saving time: a critique of discrete perception
Tomer Fekete, Sander van de Cruys, Vebjørn Ekroll, Cees van Leeuwen
Neuroscience of Consciousness 2018 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niy003 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Perception Phenomenology philosophy Cognitive psychology Consciousness Cognitive science Artificial intelligence Epistemology |
| Citations | 40 |
| Key points | Argues that the data used to support discrete perception are compatible with a continuous account, and that physiological and psychophysical constraints, along with awake-primate imaging data, indicate human neuronal networks cannot support discrete updates at maximal phenomenological rates. |
Abstract
A recently proposed model of sensory processing suggests that perceptual experience is updated in discrete steps. We show that the data advanced to support discrete perception are in fact compatible with a continuous account of perception. Physiological and psychophysical constraints, moreover, as well as our awake-primate imaging data, imply that human neuronal networks cannot support discrete updates of perceptual content at the maximal update rates consistent with phenomenology. A more comprehensive approach to understanding the physiology of perception (and experience at large) is therefore called for, and we briefly outline our take on the problem.