Collabra Psychology
2021
Peter Lush, R. B. Y. Scott, Anil K. Seth et al.
35 citations
Phenomenological control is the ability to generate experiences to meet expectancies. There are stable trait differences in this ability, as shown by responses to imaginative suggestions of, for example, paralysis, amnesia, and auditory, visual, gustatory and tactile hallucinations. Phenomenological control has primarily been studied within the context of hypnosis, in which suggestions are...
Nature Communications
September 25, 2020
Peter Lush, Vanessa Botan, R. B. Y. Scott et al.
136 citations
In hypnotic responding, expectancies arising from imaginative suggestion drive striking experiential changes (e.g., hallucinations) - which are experienced as involuntary - according to a normally distributed and stable trait ability (hypnotisability). Such experiences can be triggered by implicit suggestion and occur outside the hypnotic context. In large sample studies (of 156, 404 and 353...
July 23, 2020
Zoltan Dienes, Bence Pálfi, Peter Lush
1 citation
preprint
This chapter reviews evidence that people have, to a varying degree, a trait ability to control phenomenology; that is, to construct subjective experiences according to situational requirements. The experiences can be subjectively compelling ones of involuntariness (for actually intentional movements); of perceptions (that grossly misrepresent reality); and of having beliefs (that in fact one...
Psychology of Consciousness Theory Research and Practice
June 25, 2020
Zoltan Dienes, Peter Lush, Bence Pálfi et al.
42 citations
We first review recent work from our laboratory, which construes hypnotizability as an example of a more general trait of capacity for phenomenological control, which people can use to create subjective experiences in many nonhypnotic contexts where those experiences fulfill people's goals. Second, we review recent work, which construes phenomenological control as a specifically metacognitive...