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Peter Lush

11 papers in the library · 234 citations · publishing 2016-2026

Papers

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Trait phenomenological control predicts belief-reinforcing unusual experiences

PsyArXiv July 21, 2026 Peter Lush, Ryan Bradley Scott, Max Lovell et al. preprint

Phenomenological control is the stable trait ability to alter subjective experience according to one’s goals. Although voluntary, experiences arising from phenomenological control are experienced as involuntary and may be incorrectly attributed to external causes. Such experiences may influence related beliefs about the world. In a large sample preregistered study (n = 497), we tested...

Expectancies and the generation of perceptual experience: Predictive processing and phenomenological control

June 30, 2023 Peter Lush, Zoltan Dienes, Anil K. Seth 2 citations preprint

Phenomenological control is the stable trait ability to alter subjective experience in accordance with goals. Although voluntary, phenomenological control is experienced as involuntary and has predominantly been studied within the context of hypnosis, in which direct verbal imaginative suggestions for a range of experiences are given by a designated ‘hypnotist’ (e.g., involuntary movement,...

The Role of Phenomenological Control in Experience

Current Directions in Psychological Science February 21, 2023 Zoltan Dienes, Peter Lush 18 citations

To varying degrees, people have the capacity to alter their subjective experience such that it misrepresents reality in ways consistent with their goals and such that the misrepresentation can be sustained over at least minutes despite clear contrary evidence. In other words, people have a capacity for phenomenological control. People can use this capacity to fulfill requirements of social...

The Phenomenological Control Scale: Measuring the Capacity for Creating Illusory Nonvolition, Hallucination and Delusion

Collabra Psychology 2021 Peter Lush, R. B. Y. Scott, Anil K. Seth et al. 35 citations

Phenomenological control is the ability to generate experiences to meet expectancies. There are stable trait differences in this ability, as shown by responses to imaginative suggestions of, for example, paralysis, amnesia, and auditory, visual, gustatory and tactile hallucinations. Phenomenological control has primarily been studied within the context of hypnosis, in which suggestions are...

DOI: 10.1525/collabra.29542 (opens in new tab) Full text (opens in new tab) Hypnosis Hypnotic susceptibility Context archaeology Cognitive psychology

Trait phenomenological control predicts experience of mirror synaesthesia and the rubber hand illusion

Nature Communications September 25, 2020 Peter Lush, Vanessa Botan, R. B. Y. Scott et al. 136 citations

In hypnotic responding, expectancies arising from imaginative suggestion drive striking experiential changes (e.g., hallucinations) - which are experienced as involuntary - according to a normally distributed and stable trait ability (hypnotisability). Such experiences can be triggered by implicit suggestion and occur outside the hypnotic context. In large sample studies (of 156, 404 and 353...

DOI: 10.1038/s41467-020-18591-6 (opens in new tab) Full text (opens in new tab) Experiential learning Hypnotic susceptibility Hypnosis Trait +5

Controlling phenomenology by being unaware of intentions

July 23, 2020 Zoltan Dienes, Bence Pálfi, Peter Lush 1 citation preprint

This chapter reviews evidence that people have, to a varying degree, a trait ability to control phenomenology; that is, to construct subjective experiences according to situational requirements. The experiences can be subjectively compelling ones of involuntariness (for actually intentional movements); of perceptions (that grossly misrepresent reality); and of having beliefs (that in fact one...

DOI: 10.31234/osf.io/4zw6g_v1 (opens in new tab) Phenomenology philosophy Cognitive psychology Epistemology

Phenomenological control as cold control.

Psychology of Consciousness Theory Research and Practice June 25, 2020 Zoltan Dienes, Peter Lush, Bence Pálfi et al. 42 citations

We first review recent work from our laboratory, which construes hypnotizability as an example of a more general trait of capacity for phenomenological control, which people can use to create subjective experiences in many nonhypnotic contexts where those experiences fulfill people's goals. Second, we review recent work, which construes phenomenological control as a specifically metacognitive...

DOI: 10.1037/cns0000230 (opens in new tab) Full text (opens in new tab) Mindfulness Cognitive psychology Control management Context archaeology +3

Time perception and the experience of agency in meditation and hypnosis

PsyArXiv October 3, 2018 Peter Lush, Zoltan Dienes preprint

Mindfulness meditation and hypnosis are related in opposing ways to awareness of intentions. The cold control theory of hypnosis proposes that hypnotic responding involves the experience of involuntariness while performing an actually intentional action. Hypnosis therefore relies upon inaccurate metacognition about intentional actions and experiences. Mindfulness meditation centrally involves...

The Sussex-Waterloo Scale of Hypnotizability (SWASH): measuring capacity for altering conscious experience.

Neuroscience of Consciousness 2018 Peter Lush, G Moga, N McLatchie et al.

The ability to respond to hypnotic suggestibility (hypnotizability) is a stable trait which can be measured in a standardized procedure consisting of a hypnotic induction and a series of hypnotic suggestions. The SWASH is a 10-item adaptation of an established scale, the Waterloo-Stanford Group C Scale of Hypnotic Suggestibility (WSGC). Development of the SWASH was motivated by three distinct...

DOI: 10.1093/nc/niy006 (opens in new tab) Full text (opens in new tab) Agency Contents of consciousness Hypnosis Intention +1

Metacognition of intentions in mindfulness and hypnosis.

Neuroscience of Consciousness 2016 Peter Lush, Peter L N Naish, Zoltan Dienes

In a famous series of experiments, Libet investigated the subjective timing of awareness of an intention to move, a task that can be considered a metacognitive judgement. The ability to strategically produce inaccurate metacognitions about intentions has been postulated to be central to the changes in judgements of agency common to all hypnotic responding. Therefore, differences in...

Illusory Temporal Binding in Meditators.

Mindfulness 2016 Peter Lush, Jim Parkinson, Zoltan Dienes

We investigate conditions in which more accurate metacognition may lead to greater susceptibility to illusion and thus conditions under which mindfulness meditation may lead to less accurate perceptions. Specifically, greater awareness of intentions may lead to an illusory compression of time between a voluntary action and its outcome ("intentional binding"). Here, we report that experienced...