Hypnotisability—a normally distributed, stable trait—predicts experiential changes like hallucinations in response to imaginative suggestion, which feel involuntary. Such experiences can also be triggered by implicit suggestion outside hypnosis. In three large samples (156, 404, and 353 participants), substantial relationships were found between hypnotisability and experiential change in mirror-sensory synaesthesia and the rubber hand illusion, comparable to relationships with individual hypnosis scale items. The control of phenomenology to meet expectancies from perceived task requirements may explain experiential change in psychological experiments.
Hypnotizability reflects a broader trait called phenomenological control, which allows people to create subjective experiences in nonhypnotic contexts to fulfill goals. This control operates as a metacognitive process where intentional actions occur without awareness of specific intentions, known as cold control. Laboratory phenomena such as vicarious pain, mirror-touch synesthesia, and the rubber hand illusion may partly result from phenomenological control. A new theory of intentional binding measures the absence of conscious intentions in hypnosis. No evidence suggests cold control confers abilities beyond changes in metacognitive monitoring, and a negative correlation exists between mindfulness and cold control, viewed as a lack of awareness of intentions.
Phenomenological control—the ability to generate experiences to match expectancies—varies as a stable trait and can be measured through responses to imaginative suggestions such as paralysis, amnesia, or hallucinations. While traditionally studied within hypnosis, the context of hypnosis itself may distort scores due to misconceptions. The Phenomenological Control Scale (PCS), adapted from the Sussex Waterloo Scale of Hypnotizability but without hypnotic framing, yields higher mean scores and similar reliability on its subjective scale. The PCS is thus a valid tool for assessing trait phenomenological control outside the hypnotic context, suitable for broader psychological experiments.
People vary in their ability to deliberately construct subjective experiences—such as feeling that a movement is involuntary, perceiving something that is not real, or believing something they do not actually believe—a trait called phenomenological control. These constructed experiences are accompanied by genuine neural and physiological activity. The ability works by intentionally creating a first-order mental state while maintaining a higher-order thought that one is not intending to do so. Phenomenological control can be used to demonstrate shared group values, produce hypnotic responses, or generate phenomena in psychological experiments that are suggested by demand characteristics.