Building perception block by block: a response to Fekete et al.
Adrien Doerig, Frank Scharnowski, Michael H Herzog
Neuroscience of Consciousness January 1, 2019 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niy012 (opens in new tab) via PubMed
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractThe longstanding debate over whether conscious perception is continuous or discrete is addressed with a two-stage model in which unconscious processing integrates information continuously until a discrete conscious percept forms. In response to criticism from Fekete et al., the authors argue that simple sliding windows cannot account for apparent motion and related phenomena within a continuous framework. They also contend that the supervenience argument raised by their critics applies only to qualia realists, a philosophical position the authors do not adopt.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Consciousness Discrete perception |
| Key finding | Argues that their two-stage model of consciousness, where unconscious processing integrates information before a discrete conscious percept, withstands criticism from Fekete et al. |
Abstract
Is consciousness a continuous stream, or do percepts occur only at certain moments of time? This age-old question is still under debate. Both positions face difficult problems, which we proposed to overcome with a 2-stage model, where unconscious processing continuously integrates information before a discrete, conscious percept occurs. Recently, Fekete et al. criticized our model. Here, we show that, contrary to their proposal, simple sliding windows cannot explain apparent motion and related phenomena within a continuous framework, and that their supervenience argument only holds true for qualia realists, a philosophical position we do not adopt.