Scientific Reports
July 14, 2021
Tomer Fekete, Hermann Hinrichs, Jacobo Diego Sitt et al.
The brain is universally regarded as a system for processing information. If so, any behavioral or cognitive dysfunction should lend itself to depiction in terms of information processing deficiencies. Information is characterized by recursive, hierarchical complexity. The brain accommodates this complexity by a hierarchy of large/slow and small/fast spatiotemporal loops of activity. Thus,...
Neuroimage
December 1, 2018
Tomer Fekete, D. Omer, Kazunori O’Hashi et al.
&NA; Critical dynamics are thought to play an important role in neuronal information‐processing: near critical networks exhibit neuronal avalanches, cascades of spatiotemporal activity that are scale‐free, and are considered to enhance information capacity and transfer. However, the exact relationship between criticality, awareness, and information integration remains unclear. To characterize...
Neuroscience of Consciousness
2018
Tomer Fekete, Sander van de Cruys, Vebjørn Ekroll et al.
40 citations
A recently proposed model of sensory processing suggests that perceptual experience is updated in discrete steps. We show that the data advanced to support discrete perception are in fact compatible with a continuous account of perception. Physiological and psychophysical constraints, moreover, as well as our awake-primate imaging data, imply that human neuronal networks cannot support discrete...
Frontiers in Psychology
October 4, 2016
Tomer Fekete, Cees van Leeuwen, Shimon Edelman
A computational theory of consciousness should include a quantitative measure of consciousness, or MoC, that (i) would reveal to what extent a given system is conscious, (ii) would make it possible to compare not only different systems, but also the same system at different times, and (iii) would be graded, because so is consciousness. However, unless its design is properly constrained, such an...
Animal Sentience
August 19, 2016
Shimon Edelman, Roy Moyal, Tomer Fekete
16 citations
Klein & Barron’s (2016) (K & B’s) case for insect consciousness is a welcome development in an area that, in all of the science and philosophy of mind, is probably the most anthropocentric. In this commentary, we seek to strengthen K & B’s side of the argument by appealing not just to putative neural mechanisms but also to computational theory that supports it (section 1). We also offer some...