Defending subjective inflation: an inference to the best explanation.
J D Knotts, Matthias Michel, Brian Odegaard
Neuroscience of Consciousness 2020 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niaa025 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Commentary Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Consciousness Filling-in Perceptual confidence Signal detection theory Subjective inflation |
| Key points | Argues that subjective inflation is an intraperceptual phenomenon distinct from filling-in, and contends that the available evidence generally supports intraperceptual interpretations of visibility and confidence judgments over post-perceptual ones. |
Abstract
In a recent opinion piece, Abid (2019) criticizes the hypothesis that subjective inflation may partly account for apparent phenomenological richness across the visual field and outside the focus of attention. In response, we address three main issues. First, we maintain that inflation should be interpreted as an intraperceptual-and not post-perceptual-phenomenon. Second, we describe how inflation may differ from filling-in. Finally, we contend that, in general, there is sufficient evidence to tip the scales toward intraperceptual interpretations of visibility and confidence judgments.
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