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Panpsychism and the Depsychologization of Consciousness

Keith Frankish

Supplementary volume - Aristotelian Society July 1, 2021 DOI: 10.1093/arisup/akab012 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Key points Argues that panpsychism, while taking depsychologization seriously, consigns consciousness to a metaphysical limbo beyond science and devoid of ethical or personal significance, and that the depsychologized conception of consciousness should be questioned.

Abstract

The problem of consciousness arises when we depsychologize consciousness—that is, conceptualize it in terms of phenomenal feel rather than psychological function. Panpsychism offers an elegant solution to the problem, which takes depsychologization seriously. In doing so, however, it also illustrates the perils of depsychologization. Nagasawa highlights one dead end for panpsychism, and I shall argue that there are more. Panpsychism consigns consciousness to a metaphysical limbo where it is beyond the reach of science and lacks ethical and personal significance. The moral is that we should retrace our steps and question the depsychologized conception itself.

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