Panpsychism and the Depsychologization of Consciousness
Supplementary volume - Aristotelian Society July 1, 2021 DOI: 10.1093/arisup/akab012 (opens in new tab) via Semantic Scholar
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractThe problem of consciousness arises when it is conceptualized in terms of phenomenal feel rather than psychological function. Panpsychism offers an elegant solution by taking this depsychologization seriously, but it also illustrates its perils. Beyond one dead end highlighted by Nagasawa, panpsychism consigns consciousness to a metaphysical limbo beyond science and lacking ethical and personal significance. The argument suggests retracing steps and questioning the depsychologized conception itself.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Philosophy |
| Key finding | Argues that panpsychism, while taking depsychologization seriously, consigns consciousness to a metaphysical limbo beyond science and devoid of ethical or personal significance, and that the depsychologized conception of consciousness should be questioned. |
Abstract
The problem of consciousness arises when we depsychologize consciousness—that is, conceptualize it in terms of phenomenal feel rather than psychological function. Panpsychism offers an elegant solution to the problem, which takes depsychologization seriously. In doing so, however, it also illustrates the perils of depsychologization. Nagasawa highlights one dead end for panpsychism, and I shall argue that there are more. Panpsychism consigns consciousness to a metaphysical limbo where it is beyond the reach of science and lacks ethical and personal significance. The moral is that we should retrace our steps and question the depsychologized conception itself.