Quining Diet Qualia Part I

The article argues that the watered-down "diet" conception of qualia—stripped of intrinsic, ineffable, and subjective properties—has no distinctive content and cannot serve as a neutral explanandum for theories of phenomenal consciousness. If classic qualia realism is rejected, there is no phenomenal residue left to explain; only "zero" qualia remain, which are dispositions to judge that experiences have classic qualia. The author concludes that diet qualia should be quined, or eliminated, as a useful concept.

Study at a glance

Abstract

This is the first part of the article by Keith Frankish Quining Diet Qualia, which asks whether we can identify a neutral explanandum for theories of phenomenal consciousness, acceptable to all sides. The “classic” conception of qualia, on which qualia are intrinsic, ineffable, and subjective, will not serve this purpose, but it is widely assumed that a watered-down “diet” conception will. The author argues that this is wrong and that the diet notion of qualia has no distinctive content. There is no phenomenal residue left when qualia are stripped of their intrinsicality, ineffability, and subjectivity. Thus, if we reject classic qualia realism, we should accept that all that needs explaining are “zero” qualia – our dispositions to judge that our experiences have classic qualia. Diet qualia should, in Dennett’s phrase, be quined.