Quining Diet Qualia Part I
Keith Frankish, Maxim Gorbachev
Voprosy Filosofii July 1, 2024 DOI: 10.21146/0042-8744-2024-7-131-138 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that the diet notion of qualia has no distinctive content and should be eliminated rather than accepted as a neutral explanandum for theories of phenomenal consciousness. |
Abstract
This is the first part of the article by Keith Frankish Quining Diet Qualia, which asks whether we can identify a neutral explanandum for theories of phenomenal consciousness, acceptable to all sides. The “classic” conception of qualia, on which qualia are intrinsic, ineffable, and subjective, will not serve this purpose, but it is widely assumed that a watered-down “diet” conception will. The author argues that this is wrong and that the diet notion of qualia has no distinctive content. There is no phenomenal residue left when qualia are stripped of their intrinsicality, ineffability, and subjectivity. Thus, if we reject classic qualia realism, we should accept that all that needs explaining are “zero” qualia – our dispositions to judge that our experiences have classic qualia. Diet qualia should, in Dennett’s phrase, be quined.