Quining Diet Qualia Part II

Abstract

This is the second part of the article by Keith Frankish Quining Diet Qualia, which asks whether we can identify a neutral explanandum for theories of phe­nomenal consciousness, acceptable to all sides. The “classic” conception of qualia, on which qualia are intrinsic, ineffable, and subjective, will not serve this pur­pose, but it is widely assumed that a watered-down “diet” conception will. I ar­gue that this is wrong and that the diet notion of qualia has no distinctive con­tent. There is no phenomenal residue left when qualia are stripped of their intrinsicality, ineffability, and subjectivity. Thus, if we reject classic qualia real­ism, we should accept that all that needs explaining are “zero” qualia – our dis­positions to judge that our experiences have classic qualia. Diet qualia should, in Dennett’s phrase, be quined