Quining Diet Qualia Part II

The classic conception of qualia—as intrinsic, ineffable, and subjective features of experience—cannot serve as a neutral starting point for theories of phenomenal consciousness. A watered-down "diet" version of qualia is often assumed to fill this role, but the article argues that this diet notion has no distinctive content. Once qualia are stripped of intrinsicality, ineffability, and subjectivity, no phenomenal residue remains. Therefore, if classic qualia realism is rejected, what needs explaining are only "zero" qualia: dispositions to judge that experiences have classic qualia. Diet qualia should be abandoned.

Study at a glance

Abstract

This is the second part of the article by Keith Frankish Quining Diet Qualia, which asks whether we can identify a neutral explanandum for theories of phe­nomenal consciousness, acceptable to all sides. The “classic” conception of qualia, on which qualia are intrinsic, ineffable, and subjective, will not serve this pur­pose, but it is widely assumed that a watered-down “diet” conception will. I ar­gue that this is wrong and that the diet notion of qualia has no distinctive con­tent. There is no phenomenal residue left when qualia are stripped of their intrinsicality, ineffability, and subjectivity. Thus, if we reject classic qualia real­ism, we should accept that all that needs explaining are “zero” qualia – our dis­positions to judge that our experiences have classic qualia. Diet qualia should, in Dennett’s phrase, be quined