Illusionism and the distortion thesis

Abstract

The illusionist theory of consciousness denies the existence of the ‘phenomenal’ properties widely thought to render experience conscious. Central to the illusionist approach is what we call the distortion thesis — the claim that introspective mechanisms systematically misrepresent neural processes in a way that strongly inclines us to judge that they have phenomenal properties, creating the ‘illusion’ of phenomenality. However, there is no consensus among illusionists as to the exact nature of this distortion and there has been relatively little exploration of the options. This article seeks to make progress by mapping some patterns of distortion compatible with an illusionist approach. We propose a preliminary classification scheme based on the three dimensions of positiveness , conceptuality , and dispellability , and use this scheme to describe eight possible distortion patterns, each corresponding to a different hypothesis about how the illusion of phenomenality is created. We offer tentative assessments of the plausibility of these patterns from the perspective of the distortion thesis, but we do not argue for a specific view. Our aim here is to map possibilities, stimulate further theorizing, and encourage empirical research on the nature of introspective distortion. Both illusionists and their opponents should welcome this increased scrutiny of a key element of the illusionist approach.