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Editorial: The end of qualia. Do we still need phenomenology in the science of consciousness?

Michela Balconi, Valentina Cardella, Richard Leighton Greene, Riccardo Manzotti, Gianfranco Pecchinenda, Pietro Perconti, Silvano Zipoli Caiani

Frontiers in Psychology October 28, 2026 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2026.2016636 (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Key points Argues that qualia shaped the science of consciousness by forcing attention onto whether explaining information access suffices to explain conscious experience, and that the qualia debate established experience as something any adequate account of consciousness must address. Notes that qualia also became central to a challenge to physicalism.

Abstract

Qualia have played a key role in the development of a science of consciousness. They brought into focus the question of whether explaining the availability of information for reasoning, verbal report, and the control of action would suffice to explain conscious experience. A science confined to access consciousness would have to justify that restriction and explain what became of the experiential dimension. The debate about qualia helped establish experience as something that any adequate account of consciousness must address. Alongside this contribution, qualia acquired a further role. They became central to a challenge to physicalism.

In the evidence

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  • Argues that the qualia debate forced attention onto whether explaining information access suffices to explain conscious experience and established experience as something any adequate account of consciousness must address.

    Synthesized

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