Consciousness and Object
Advances in Consciousness Research October 19, 2017 DOI: 10.1075/aicr.95 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Proposes a "mind-object identity theory" in which being conscious of an object is simply being made of that object, making consciousness physical but not neural. Argues this hypothesis is supported by recent empirical findings in perception and neuroscience and can withstand objections from illusion, hallucination, dreams, and mental imagery, and compares it with externalist approaches such as disjunctivism, realism, embodied cognition, enactivism, and the extended mind. |
Abstract
What is the conscious mind? What is experience? In 1968, David Armstrong asked “What is a man?” and replied that a man is “a certain sort of material object”. This book starts from his question but proceeds along a different path. The traditional mind-brain identity theory is set aside, and a mind-object identity theory is proposed in its place: to be conscious of an object is simply to be made of that object. Consciousness is physical but not neural. This groundbreaking hypothesis is supported by recent empirical findings in both perception and neuroscience, and is herein tested against a series of objections of both conceptual and empirical nature: the traditional mind-brain identity arguments from illusion, hallucinations, dreams, and mental imagery. The theory is then compared with existing externalist approaches including disjunctivism, realism, embodied cognition, enactivism, and the extended mind. Can experience and objects be one and the same?
Citations in the library
Cited by 4
- Embodied AI beyond Embodied Cognition and Enactivism Philosophies July 16, 2019
- The Chimeric Self: A Neo Naturalist Bundle Theory of the Self. Frontiers in Psychology 2019
- Naturalizing Phenomenology: A Must Have? Frontiers in Psychology October 22, 2018
- Good Old-Fashioned Artificial Consciousness and the Intermediate Level Fallacy. Frontiers in Robotics and AI 2018
Cites 31
- An information integration theory of consciousness BMC Neuroscience November 2, 2004
- Neural correlates of consciousness: progress and problems Nature Reviews Neuroscience April 20, 2016
- Consciousness as Integrated Information: a Provisional Manifesto Biological Bulletin December 1, 2008
- Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences December 1, 2007
- Decoupling of the brain's default mode network during deep sleep Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences June 19, 2009
and 26 more in the library