6 papers in the library · publishing 2005-2022
Philosophies June 23, 2022 Igor Aleksander
In the period between Turing’s 1950 “Computing Machinery and Intelligence” and the current considerable public exposure to the term “artificial intelligence (AI)”, Turing’s question “Can a machine think?” has become a topic of daily debate in the media, the home, and, indeed, the pub. However, “Can a machine think?” is sliding towards a more controversial issue: “Can a machine be conscious?” Of...
Advances in experimental medicine and biology 2011 Igor Aleksander, David Gamez
In recent years a number of people have suggested that there is a close link between conscious experience and the differentiation and integration of information in certain areas of the brain. The balance between differentiation and integration is often called information integration, and a number of algorithms for measuring it have been put forward, which can be used to make predictions about...
International Journal of Machine Consciousness June 1, 2010 Igor Aleksander
Sloman's critique of almost all the work that goes under the heading of Machine Consciousness (MC) stems from his assertion that one cannot base a constructive science on a confused concept. This brief comment is an attempt to look at some bits of Sloman's own contribution, whether he overcomes this difficulty or whether the difficulty may be addressed through the very use of a constructive...
Neural networks : the official journal of the International Neural Network Society November 2007 Igor Aleksander, Helen Morton
A model of conscious mechanisms called Axiomatic Consciousness Theory (ACT) is used to develop a neuroarchitectural model of visual phenomenology. The result is an extension of concepts in neural systems towards phenomenal intentionality: the lack of which is a common starting point for critiques of AI. Here the argument is developed at four interacting grain levels of description and the...
International Journal of Pattern Recognition and Artificial Intelligence September 1, 2006 Igor Aleksander, Helen Morton
In this paper we argue that phenomenology needs to be supported by explicit mechanisms if one is to have computational models of consciousness. Computational work in this area is reviewed and a set of axioms that help to decompose being conscious into manageable concepts is evoked. This leads to a kernel architecture and a digital implementation which is shown to work in examples of visual...
Progress in Brain Research 2005 Igor Aleksander
The work from several laboratories on the modeling of consciousness is reviewed. This ranges, on one hand, from purely functional models where behavior is important and leads to an attribution of consciousness to, on the other hand, material work closely derived from the information about the anatomy of the brain. At the functional end of the spectrum, applications are described specifically...