International Journal of Machine Consciousness
June 1, 2011
K. Thomsen
15 citations
The Ouroboros Model features a biologically inspired cognitive architecture. At its core lies a self-referential recursive process with alternating phases of data acquisition and evaluation. Memory entries are organized in schemata. The activation at a time of part of a schema biases the whole structure and, in particular, missing features, thus triggering expectations. An iterative recursive...
International Journal of Machine Consciousness
June 1, 2011
Alfredo Pereira, Leonardo Ferreira Almada
13 citations
In the book Conceptual Spaces: the Geometry of Thought [2000] Peter Gärdenfors proposes a new framework for cognitive science. Complementary to symbolic and subsymbolic [connectionist] descriptions, conceptual spaces are semantic structures constructed from empirical data representing the universe of mental states. We argue that Gärdenfors' modeling can be used in consciousness research to...
International Journal of Machine Consciousness
June 1, 2011
Susan Stuart
7 citations
In this short paper I will introduce an idea which, I will argue, presents a fundamental additional challenge to the machine consciousness community.The idea takes the questions surrounding phenomenology, qualia and phenomenality one step further into the realm of intersubjectivity but with a twist, and the twist is this: that an agent's intersubjective experience is deeply felt and necessarily...
International Journal of Machine Consciousness
August 24, 2010
Raúl Arrabales, Agapito Ledezma, Araceli Sanchis
9 citations
The progress in the machine consciousness research fiel has to be assessed in terms of the features demonstrated by the new models and implementations currently being designed. In this paper, we focus on the functional aspects of consciousness and propose the application of a revision of ConsScale a biologically inspired scale for measuring cognitive development in artificial agents in order to...
International Journal of Machine Consciousness
June 1, 2010
Aaron Sloman
81 citations
This paper is an attempt to summarise and justify critical comments I have been making over several decades about research on consciousness by philosophers, scientists and engineers. This includes (a) explaining why the concept of “phenomenal consciousness” (P-C), in the sense defined by Ned Block, is semantically flawed and unsuitable as a target for scientific research or machine modelling,...
International Journal of Machine Consciousness
June 1, 2010
Cristiano Castelfranchi
1 citation
After discussing a possible contradiction in Sloman's very challenging intervention, I stress the need for not identifying with phenomenal consciousness and with the qualia problem. I claim that it is necessary to distinguish different forms and functions of and to explicitly model them, also by exploiting the specific advantage of AI: to make experiments impossible in nature, by separating...
International Journal of Machine Consciousness
June 1, 2010
Roberto Cordeschi
1 citation
A comment on a target paper by A. Sloman on machine consciouness.
International Journal of Machine Consciousness
June 1, 2010
Igor Aleksander
Sloman's critique of almost all the work that goes under the heading of Machine Consciousness (MC) stems from his assertion that one cannot base a constructive science on a confused concept. This brief comment is an attempt to look at some bits of Sloman's own contribution, whether he overcomes this difficulty or whether the difficulty may be addressed through the very use of a constructive...
International Journal of Machine Consciousness
June 1, 2010
Piotr Bołtuć
Sloman criticizes all existing attempts to define machine consciousness for being overly one-sided. He argues that such definition is not only unattainable but also unnecessary. The critique is well taken in part; yet, whatever his intended aims, by not acknowledging the non-reductive aspects of consciousness, Sloman, in fact, sides with the reductivist view.
International Journal of Machine Consciousness
December 1, 2009
David Gamez
25 citations
The question about the potential for consciousness of artificial systems has often been addressed using thought experiments, which are often problematic in the philosophy of mind. A more promising approach is to use real experiments to gather data about the correlates of consciousness in humans, and develop this data into theories that make predictions about human and artificial consciousness....
International Journal of Machine Consciousness
December 1, 2009
Uma Ramamurthy, Stan Franklin
6 citations
Cognitive theories of consciousness should provide effective frameworks to implement machine consciousness. The Global Workspace Theory is a leading theory of consciousness which postulates that the primary function of consciousness is a global broadcast that facilitates recruitment of internal resources to deal with the current situation as well as modulate several types of learning. In this...
International Journal of Machine Consciousness
December 1, 2009
Raúl Arrabales, Agapito Ledezma, Araceli Sanchis
5 citations
The accurate measurement of the level of consciousness of a creature remains a major scientific challenge, nevertheless a number of new accounts that attempt to address this problem have been proposed recently. In this paper we analyze the principles of these new measures of consciousness along with other classical approaches focusing on their applicability to Machine Consciousness (MC)....
International Journal of Machine Consciousness
May 19, 2009
Bernard J. Baars, Stan Franklin
149 citations
We argue that the functions of consciousness are implemented in a bio-computational manner. That is to say, the conscious as well as the non-conscious aspects of human thinking, planning, and perception are produced by adaptive, biological algorithms. We propose that machine consciousness may be produced by similar adaptive algorithms running on the machine.Global Workspace Theory is currently...
International Journal of Machine Consciousness
May 19, 2009
Anil K. Seth
45 citations
Machine (artificial) consciousness can be interpreted in both strong and weak forms, as an instantiation or as a simulation. Here, I argue in favor of weak artificial consciousness, proposing that synthetic models of neural mechanisms potentially underlying consciousness can shed new light on how these mechanisms give rise to the phenomena they do. The approach I advocate involves using...
International Journal of Machine Consciousness
May 19, 2009
Ron Chrisley
34 citations
The term "synthetic phenomenology" refers to: 1) any attempt to characterize the phenomenal states possessed, or modeled by, an artefact (such as a robot); or 2) any attempt to use an artefact to help specify phenomenal states (independently of whether such states are possessed by a naturally conscious being or an artefact). The notion of synthetic phenomenology is clarified, and distinguished...
International Journal of Machine Consciousness
May 19, 2009
Stan Franklin, Sidney K. D’Mello, Bernard J. Baars et al.
22 citations
The currently leading cognitive theory of consciousness, Global Workspace Theory (Baars 1988, 2003), postulates that the primary functions of consciousness include a global broadcast serving to recruit internal resources with which to deal with the current situation and to modulate several types of learning. In addition, conscious experiences present current conditions and problems to a “self ”...
International Journal of Machine Consciousness
May 19, 2009
Piotr Bołtuć
20 citations
Machines can be conscious, is the claim to be adopted here, upon examination of its different versions. We distinguish three kinds of consciousness: functional, phenomenal and hard consciousness (f-, p- and h-consciousness). Robots are functionally conscious already. There is also a clear project in AI on how to make computers phenomenally conscious, though criteria differ. Discussion about...
International Journal of Machine Consciousness
May 19, 2009
Carlos Hernández, Ignacio López Paniagua, Ricardo Sanz
12 citations
The functional capabilities that consciousness seems to provide to biological systems can supply valuable principles in the design of more autonomous and robust technical systems. These functional concepts keep a notable similarity to those underlying the notion of operating system in software engineering, which allows us to specialize the computer metaphor for the mind into that of the...