4 papers in the library · 20 citations · publishing 1998-2017
Entropy November 22, 2017 Piotr Bołtuć
The paper introduces the notion of “metacomputable” processes as those which are the product of computable processes. This notion seems interesting in the instance when metacomputable processes may not be computable themselves, but are produced by computable ones. The notion of computability used here relies on Turing computability. When we talk about something being non-computable, this can be...
International Journal of Machine Consciousness June 1, 2010 Piotr Bołtuć
Sloman criticizes all existing attempts to define machine consciousness for being overly one-sided. He argues that such definition is not only unattainable but also unnecessary. The critique is well taken in part; yet, whatever his intended aims, by not acknowledging the non-reductive aspects of consciousness, Sloman, in fact, sides with the reductivist view.
International Journal of Machine Consciousness May 19, 2009 Piotr Bołtuć 20 citations
Machines can be conscious, is the claim to be adopted here, upon examination of its different versions. We distinguish three kinds of consciousness: functional, phenomenal and hard consciousness (f-, p- and h-consciousness). Robots are functionally conscious already. There is also a clear project in AI on how to make computers phenomenally conscious, though criteria differ. Discussion about...
The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 1998 Piotr Bołtuć
Jackson claims that a person who sees colors for the first time by this very fact acquires a certain knowledge which she or he could not have learned in a black and white world. This argument can be generalized to other secondary qualities. I argue that this claim is indefensible without implicit recourse to the first-person experience; also Nagel’s "what it is like" argument is polemically...