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A Conscious Universe

Philip Goff

Oxford Scholarship Online August 24, 2017 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190677015.003.0009 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Key points Argues that cosmopsychism offers a solution to the Subject Irreducibility Problem and that an empirical argument against emergentism leads to cosmopsychism as the only viable anti-emergentist view.

Abstract

This chapter explores and defends a form of cosmopsychism: the combination of panpsychism and priority monism (the latter being the view that there is only one fundamental individual). The crucial advantage of cosmopsychism is that it offers a solution to the Subject Irreducibility Problem, discussed in the last chapter. After developing the view in response to various challenges, an empirical argument is advanced against emergentism. If this argument is sound, then it leads to cosmopsychism as the only anti-emergentist view that can solve the Subject Irreducibility Problem. Finally, the chapter responds to “the incredulous stare”: the sense that cosmopsychism is just too crazy to be believed. It is argued that this reaction is due to cultural associations; in fact, both comospychism and physicalism are motivated by the same anti-emergentist instincts.