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Revelation, Consciousness+ and the Phenomenal Powers View

Philip Goff

Topoi October 19, 2018 DOI: 10.1007/s11245-018-9594-9 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Citations 9
Key points Argues that Revelation pushes toward epiphenomenalism, critiques Mørch's 'phenomenal powers view', and defends a form of the 'consciousness+' response.

Abstract

Revelation is roughly the thesis that we have introspective access to the essential nature of our conscious states. This thesis is appealed to in arguments against physicalism. Little attention has been given to the problem that Revelation is a source of pressure in the direction of epiphenomenalism, as introspection does not seem to reveal our conscious states as being essentially causal. I critique Hedda Hassel Mørch’s ‘phenomenal powers view’ response to this difficulty, before defending a form of the ‘consciousness+’ response.