A priori physicalism, lonely ghosts and Cartesian doubt.

Zombies are physical duplicates of humans without consciousness, while ghosts are phenomenal duplicates whose nature is entirely conscious. Although zombie arguments against physicalism are well-known in philosophy of mind, ghostly arguments have been neglected. This paper argues that ghostly arguments hold several dialectical advantages over zombie arguments. It then explains how the conceivability of ghosts conflicts with two forms of a priori physicalism: analytic functionalism and the Australian physicalism of Armstrong and Lewis.

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Abstract

A zombie is a physical duplicates of a human being which lacks consciousness. A ghost is a phenomenal duplicate of a human being whose nature is exhausted by consciousness. Discussion of zombie arguments, that is anti-physicalist arguments which appeal to the conceivability of zombies, is familiar in the philosophy of mind literature, whilst ghostly arguments, that is, anti-physicalist arguments which appeal to the conceivability of ghosts, are somewhat neglected. In this paper I argue that ghostly arguments have a number of dialectical advantages over zombie arguments. I go onto explain how the conceivability of ghosts is inconsistent with two kinds of a priori physicalism: analytic functionalism and the Australian physicalism of Armstrong and Lewis.