Abstract One hears a great deal about “Russellian physicalism”, “Russellian panpsychism”, and “Russellian monism”. They’re proposed as solutions to the so-called mind–body problem. There is, however, a great deal of unclarity about Russell’s views on this matter. This is partly his own fault. It’s well known that he endorses “neutral monism”, but he’s also prepared to call himself a materialist...
'Consciousness', they say, 'is a mystery'. 'We have no idea what consciousness is.' 'The great intellectual task of our time is to explain the existence of consciousness.' This paper argues that these claims are false. Using 'ψ' to denote consciousness, it argues [1] that we know what ψ is (it's not a mystery); [2] that the idea that we need to explain the existence of ψ begs the question; [3]...
Abstract This chapter offers an account of what a genuinely realistic materialism or genuinely realistic physicalism looks like. (The key is that it must be all-out realist about consciousness.) It combines this with an exposition of some of the work of Charles Augustus Strong—who is, according to this account, an exemplary, genuinely realistic materialist. C. A. Strong, who has been almost...
Rougly speaking, panpsychism is the view, that everything is mind or have consciousness. Although the view has a long and venerable tradition, and becomes more and more popular in the contemporary debate, it still has many opponents. The aim of this article is to prove that panpsychism is the best metaphysical account of the nature of the ultimate stuff of reality. At the same time, it is a...
This chapter discusses the following statements: a materialist holds that every concrete phenomenon is wholly physical or material and a realistic materialist is a full-fledged realist about consciousness. Therefore it follows that a realistic materialist must hold that consciousness is a wholly physical phenomenon, and that at least some arrangements of matter are conscious or constitute...