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VI—Panpsychism and Free Will: A Case Study in Liberal Naturalism

Philip Goff

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society July 1, 2020 DOI: 10.1093/arisoc/aoaa009 (opens in new tab)

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Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Case report Peer reviewed
Key points Argues that postulating libertarian agent causation at the micro-level is coherent and consistent with observation, and that if one accepts macro-level libertarian agent causation, there are significant advantages in also postulating its micro-level existence.

Abstract

Abstract: There has been a resurgence of interest in panpsychism in contemporary philosophy of mind. According to its supporters, panpsychism offers an attractive solution to the mind–body problem, avoiding the deep difficulties associated with the more conventional options of dualism and materialism. There has been little focus, however, on whether panpsychism can help with philosophical problems pertaining to free will. In this paper I will argue (a) that it is coherent and consistent with observation to postulate a kind of libertarian agent causation at the micro-level, and (b) that if one if believes in libertarian agent causation at the macro-level, there are significant advantages in also postulating its existence at the micro-level.

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