Why Panpsychism Doesn't Help us Explain Consciousness
Dialectica 2009 DOI: 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2009.01196.x (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 163 |
| Key points | Argues that panpsychism cannot help explain consciousness, at least not the kind of consciousness we have pre-theoretical reason to believe in, opposing the view that panpsychism's explanatory power outweighs its counterintuitive and metaphysically demanding character. |
Abstract
This paper starts from the assumption that panpsychism is counterintuitive and metaphysically demanding. A number of philosophers, whilst not denying these negative aspects of the view, think that panpsychism has in its favour that it offers a good explanation of consciousness. In opposition to this, the paper argues that panpsychism cannot help us to explain consciousness, at least not the kind of consciousness we have pre-theoretical reason to believe in.
Citations in the library
Cited by 34
- Beyond Combination: How Cosmic Consciousness Grounds Ordinary Experience Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2018
- Panpsychism and Priority Cosmopsychism Oxford University Press eBooks October 20, 2016
- Priority Cosmopsychism and the Advaita Vedānta Philosophy East and West July 7, 2017
- A quantum microtubule substrate of consciousness is experimentally supported and solves the binding and epiphenomenalism problems. Neuroscience of Consciousness 2025
- Śaṅkaran Monism and the Limits of Thought The Monist October 25, 2021
and 29 more in the library
Cites 4
- Ten Problems of Consciousness The MIT Press eBooks November 17, 1995
- Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism Oxford University Press eBooks May 29, 2008
- Unsnarling the world-knot: consciousness, freedom, and the mind-body problem Choice Reviews Online July 1, 1998
- Consciousness and Experience Mind 2020