Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
June 15, 2026
Tenzin Trepp
preprint
We examine the claim that a minimal-conceptual, “bare” awareness underlies ordinary experience, and whether this pre-conceptual awareness (PCA, or minimal-dual awareness) should be understood primarily as an earlier, biologically rooted developmental baseline, or as a disclosure of a deeper ontological reality. The Retrieval hypothesis treats PCA as a cognitive–neural default mode that can be...
Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology
June 12, 2026
Bill Brewer
Does our application of concepts in perception have a role in our understanding of the objectivity of what we perceive? I clarify a specific version of this question and present an argument for an affirmative answer: Conceptualism. I develop an objection to the resulting position drawing on Mackie's discussion in “Perception, Mind-Independence, and Berkeley”, offer an alternative...
June 11, 2026
François Kammerer
Abstract This chapter shows how the view presented in the earlier chapter, Meta-Cartesianism, solves the illusion problem: it explains the illusion of phenomenal consciousness. One thing it notably does, which other views cannot do, is explain why phenomenal consciousness seems so introspectively obvious: why it seems to us that we are acquainted with our phenomenal experiences. Doing so,...
June 11, 2026
François Kammerer
Abstract This chapter defends illusionism against various objections. First, the objection that illusionism is incoherent, because phenomenal consciousness cannot seem to exist without existing. Second, the objection that illusionism cannot explain how we represent phenomenal properties. Third, the objection that illusionism is only attractive if we assume a loaded definition of “phenomenal...
June 11, 2026
François Kammerer
Abstract This chapter characterizes the illusion problem (the problem of explaining the illusion of phenomenal consciousness) and critically examines extant candidate solutions to it. First, it shows that solving the illusion problem is essential, and it details the problem’s explanandum and desired explanans. Then, it examines various views, focusing on those of Michael Graziano and Derk...
Utilitas
June 11, 2026
Joseph Gottlieb, Jacob Berger, Bob Fischer
Abstract Many claim that there is an important relationship between consciousness and welfare. Call this general view phenomenalism . One way of fleshing out phenomenalism is to hold that consciousness is what makes one the type of entity that can be noninstrumentally better or worse off in the first place. Consciousness is at least a necessary condition on welfare subjecthood . A different...
Philosophical Studies
June 6, 2026
Tom Roberts
Abstract Talkative artificial systems can sustain a realistic impression of intelligent agency, by generating quick, fluent, and context-sensitive strings of text in response to human input. Realism about AI treats this linguistic proficiency as evidence for an underlying suite of cognitive capacities, and so regards these technologies as subjects of psychological states. Firstly, I raise a...
BMC Psychiatry
June 3, 2026
Ya-Jing Tang, Lei Yang, Wen-Hao Wang et al.
The subjective lived experience of schizophrenia among China's Z Generation (born 1995-2009) remains understudied. This population navigates a unique socio-cultural context, making their personal narratives crucial for developing effective, person-centered mental health interventions. We employed a descriptive phenomenological approach, conducting in-depth interviews with four Chinese...
Journal of Consciousness Studies
June 1, 2026
Ahmadreza Nourmohammadi, S.M.Hasan A.Shirazi
The term ‘near-death experience’ (NDE) refers to particular encounters reported by individuals who have been revived from the brink of death. The narratives provided by such individuals exhibit a core set of characteristics that are consistent across diverse populations. Although this suggests that NDEs may offer valuable insights into our understanding of the world, many scientists hold the...
Subjectivity
June 1, 2026
Jonah Y. C. Hsu
This paper confronts the crisis of subjectivity precipitated by AI’s capacity to simulate affective tone. Drawing on a recently developed six-dimensional framework of tonal responsibility, I argue that authentic tone requires alignment across intention (ethical directionality), emotion (tonal density), desire (temporal tension), shame (relational vulnerability), belief (structural commitment),...