Philosophy Compass
November 1, 2013
Melanie G. Rosen, John Sutton
32 citations
Dreams usually feature a protagonist who represents the dreamer, but sometimes self-representation is displaced, disrupted, or absent. Examining dream reports from established databanks reveals two forms of this polymorphism: dreams where the dreamer takes an external, observer perspective on themselves, and dreams where the dreamer takes someone else's perspective on events. These cases parallel the phenomenon of observer perspective in waking memory and imagination. In other dreams, the dreamer does not appear at all, and the first-person perspective is occupied by another character—termed 'vicarious dreams.' These puzzling cases pose empirical and conceptual questions about the nature of self-representation with implications beyond dreaming.
Philosophy Compass
May 28, 2023
S. Clarke, Jacob Beck
11 citations
The distinction between perception and cognition is central to many debates in philosophy and cognitive science, but its actual basis remains unclear. This introductory article summarizes recent work on the question, first considering the possibility that the perception-cognition border should be eliminated from scientific ontology. It then introduces and critically examines five positive approaches to marking such a border, framed in terms of phenomenology, revisability, modularity, format, and stimulus-dependence.
Philosophy Compass
October 1, 2012
John Spackman
5 citations
Three models for what contemporary philosophy of mind can learn from Buddhist thought are assessed. Alan Wallace's model claims that meditation reveals a primordial consciousness from which both individual consciousness and the physical world emerge. Owen Flanagan's model accepts only Buddhist insights compatible with physicalism, focusing on moral psychology and spirituality. Evan Thompson's phenomenological approach offers a non-dualistic account dissolving the explanatory gap between mind and body. Each model faces significant challenges. A different model derived from the Buddhist philosopher Nāgārjuna is proposed, showing potential to resolve challenges facing contemporary theories of consciousness.
Philosophy Compass
September 1, 2025
Daniel Villiger
The reemergence of serotonergic psychedelics in clinical research and practice has generated many debates in bioethics. This paper provides an overview of key issues in the emerging field of psychedelic ethics, organized into four categories: the implementation and execution of psychedelic research and practice, the ethics of belief as applied to psychedelic-assisted therapy, discrimination and injustice in psychedelic research and practice, and potential consequences from the expansion of psychedelic research and possible future approval of psychedelic-assisted therapy. The paper shows that psychedelic ethics has become a thriving area within bioethics, essential for grounding rapid clinical developments in robust ethical reflection.
Philosophy Compass
April 1, 2020
Jennifer Windt
Conscious experience during sleep is more varied than just dreaming, especially in non-rapid eye movement sleep, where dreamful, dreamless, and unconscious states alternate. The author argues that sleep science and philosophy have focused too narrowly on dreaming, neglecting other sleep-related experiences and the fundamental question of how conscious and unconscious sleep states relate to wakefulness and sleep stages. Surveying recent findings, the author contends that the traditional view of sleep and its connection to consciousness is flawed. A better understanding requires refining frameworks for sleep-related experiences and sleep staging together, integrating phenomenological, neuroscientific, and behavioral evidence to transform our understanding of sleep, wakefulness, and consciousness.
Philosophy Compass
November 1, 2013
John Spackman
This article examines the current viability of substance dualism, the view that the mind or person is a non-material substance. The best-known version, Cartesian dualism, has faced longstanding objections, but contemporary philosophers have developed new formulations. The author identifies three central claims shared by all forms of substance dualism, reviews recent arguments for these claims, and assesses how well different versions respond to traditional criticisms. Most contemporary forms still struggle with at least one of three major challenges: bundle theories of the self, the phenomenal concepts strategy, and concerns about explanatory simplicity.
Philosophy Compass
July 1, 2013
Dustin Stokes
Perception and cognition are typically considered distinct: seeing differs from believing. The question of whether beliefs and thoughts can directly influence what one sees is known as the cognitive penetration of perception. This paper analyzes the phenomenon, its theoretical implications for philosophy of science, epistemology, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science, and reviews experimental results and their interpretations. It concludes by proposing constraints for analyses and definitions of cognitive penetrability.
Philosophy Compass
May 1, 2007
Jakob Hohwy
The search for the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) is the starting point for the science of consciousness. This work explains the concept of NCC and provides examples of related research. It then examines how different conceptions of consciousness—such as the distinction between access and phenomenal consciousness, the difference between individual conscious states and a unified conscious field, and phenomenological approaches—affect the search for NCC. Finally, it considers what discovering the NCC might imply for the metaphysics of consciousness, especially the theory that conscious states are identical to brain states.