ABSTRACT This article provides a contemporary introduction to issues in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science that are studied within the emerging field of digital minds research. We explore the potential for AI systems to have mental states. Questions that we address include whether artificially intelligent systems can be phenomenally conscious and whether they can have propositional...
September 19, 2026Ali Ladak, Nick Corvino, David Moss et al.
preprint
Despite AI’s global reach, little is known about how laypeople outside Western contexts think about whether AI systems can be conscious—capable of subjective experience—or whether they could have moral status—warranting moral consideration. In a preregistered main and replication study, we compared such attitudes among laypeople in China and the US (main sample: N = 820; replication sample: N =...
This report presents findings from an expert survey on digital minds takeoff scenarios. The survey was conducted in early 2025 with 67 experts in digital minds research, AI research, philosophy, forecasting, and related fields. Participants provided probabilistic forecasts and qualitative reasoning on the development, characteristics, and societal impact of digital minds, that is, computer...
Dualism holds that experiences somehow arise from physical states, despite being neither identical with nor grounded in such states. This paper motivates a stringent set of constraints on constructing a dualist theory of experience. To meet the constraints, a dualist theory must: (1) construe experiences as causes of physical effects, (2) ensure that experiences do not cause observable...
Abstract Dualism holds that experiences and physical states are distinct in that neither sort of state is identical with or grounded in the other. Cognitive phenomenal realism holds that cognitive experiences are irreducible to sensory experiences. While dualism and cognitive phenomenal realism are logically orthogonal and usually discussed separately, I argue that dualism’s plausibility is...
Experiences tend to be followed by states for which they provide normative reasons. Such harmonious correlations cry out for explanation. Theories that answer or diminish these cries thereby achieve an advantage over theories that do neither. I argue that the main lines of response to these cries that are available to biological theorists-theorists who hold (roughly) that conscious subjects are...