The Evolution of Animal Consciousness
Mona‐Marie Wandrey, Marta Halina
Philosophy Compass December 1, 2025 DOI: 10.1111/phc3.70069 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that disagreement over when phenomenal consciousness evolved stems largely from unresolved debates about how to identify consciousness in extant animals, since which behavioural and neural properties are treated as evidence shapes reconstructions of its evolutionary history. The authors map the competing early-evolution and latecomer positions, analyse their underlying disagreements, and propose that evolutionary approaches can move the discussion beyond anthropocentric assumptions toward a more inclusive understanding of animal consciousness, with ethical implications for the treatment of nonhuman animals. |
Abstract
ABSTRACT The evolution of phenomenal consciousness remains a central challenge in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Although many argue that consciousness can be understood as a biological phenomenon, there is considerable disagreement about its origins. Competing theories range from early evolution views, which trace consciousness back to the Cambrian period around 540 million years ago, to latecomer theories, which associate it with complex cognition in mammals or humans. We argue that this divergence stems largely from unresolved debates about how to identify consciousness in extant animals. Which behavioural and neural properties we regard as evidence of consciousness directly impacts how we reconstruct its evolutionary history. These issues carry significant ethical implications for how we treat nonhuman animals. This paper maps the key positions in the debate, analyses their underlying disagreements and explores how evolutionary approaches might move the discussion beyond anthropocentric assumptions towards a more inclusive understanding of animal consciousness.