Locke on Personal Identity
Philosophy Compass May 27, 2011 DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2011.00402.x (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Qualitative Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 53 |
| Key points | Argues that Locke's account of personal identity rests on a psychological criterion of sameness of consciousness, but that the exact meaning of 'consciousness' remains contested among interpreters. Contends that the theory is generally read as complementing Locke's theological commitments to divine punishment and reward, while those commitments appear to require a metaphysical criterion that cannot be substance, leaving the theory open to charges of incoherence and to numerous competing interpretations. |
Abstract
Abstract Locke’s account of personal identity has been highly influential because of its emphasis on a psychological criterion. The same consciousness is required for being the same person. It is not so clear, however, exactly what Locke meant by ‘consciousness’ or by ‘having the same consciousness’. Interpretations vary: consciousness is seen as identical to memory, as identical to a first personal appropriation of mental states, and as identical to a first personal distinctive experience of the qualitative features of one’s own thinking. There is wide agreement, however, that Locke’s theory of personal identity is meant to complement his moral and theological commitments to a system of divine punishment and reward in an afterlife. But these commitments seem to require also a metaphysical criterion, and Locke is insistent that it cannot be substance. The difficulty reconciling the psychological and metaphysical requirements of the theory has led, at worst, to charges of incoherence and, at best, to a slew of interpretations, none of which is widely accepted.