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Thomistic Hylomorphism and Philosophy of Mind and Philosophy of Religion

James D. Madden

Philosophy Compass July 1, 2013 DOI: 10.1111/phc3.12041 (opens in new tab)

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Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Key points Argues that Thomistic hylomorphism can address the mind–body problem and the possibility of bodily resurrection, yielding a novel form of emergent property dualism that the authors present as metaphysically plausible and that treats mental states as irreducible without ignoring human embodiment. Also describes a live debate among Thomistic hylomorphists between "corruptionist" and "survivalist" versions of the afterlife.

Abstract

Abstract: Contemporary philosophers of mind tend to accept either some version of dualism or physicalism when considering the mind–body problem. Likewise, recent philosophers of religion typically assume that we must work within these two categories when considering problems related to the possibility of bodily resurrection. Recently, some philosophers have reintroduced the Thomistic version of hylomorphism. In this article, we will consider the distinctive doctrines of Thomistic hylomorphism and how they can be used to address concerns about both the mind–body problem and the possibility of resurrection. We will see that hylomorphism allows for a novel version of emergent property dualism that is both metaphysically plausible and allows us to recognize the irreducibility of mental states and the possibility of resurrection without ignoring the fact of human embodiment. We will also discuss the currently lively debate among Thomistic hylomorphists who advocate opposed corruptionist and survivalist versions of the afterlife.

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