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Melanie G. Rosen

5 papers in the library · 106 citations · publishing 2013-2019

Papers

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How to operationalise consciousness

Australian Journal of Psychology November 15, 2019 Glenn Carruthers, Sidney Carls-Diamante, Linus Ta-Lun Huang et al. 9 citations

ObjectiveTo review the way consciousness is operationalised in contemporary research, discuss strengths and weaknesses of current approaches and propose new measures.MethodWe first reviewed the literature pertaining to the phenomenal character of visual and self‐consciousness as well as awareness of visual stimuli. We also reviewed more problematic cases of dreams and animal consciousness,...

How bizarre? A pluralist approach to dream content.

Consciousness and Cognition July 1, 2018 Melanie G. Rosen

Are dreams bizarre, nonsensical experiences or real-world simulations? I introduce a pluralist approach to dream content that highlights the philosophical and empirical implications of treating dreaming as a highly varied experience that can be anywhere on a spectrum from truly bizarre and incoherent to wake-like and mundane. Here I discuss several explanations for why theorists disagree on...

I’m thinking your thoughts while I sleep: Sense of agency and ownership over dream thought.

Psychology of Consciousness Theory Research and Practice September 1, 2015 Melanie G. Rosen 7 citations

To what extent do I have a sense of agency over my thoughts while I dream? The sense of agency in dreams can alter in a variety of interesting ways distinct from normal, waking experience. In fact, dreams show many similarities to the experiences of individuals with schizophrenia. In this paper I analyze these alterations with a focus on distinguishing between reduced sense of agency and other...

Self‐Representation and Perspectives in Dreams

Philosophy Compass November 1, 2013 Melanie G. Rosen, John Sutton 32 citations

Abstract Integrative and naturalistic philosophy of mind can both learn from and contribute to the contemporary cognitive sciences of dreaming. Two related phenomena concerning self‐representation in dreams demonstrate the need to bring disparate fields together. In most dreams, the protagonist or dream self who experiences and actively participates in dream events is or represents the dreamer:...

What I make up when I wake up: anti-experience views and narrative fabrication of dreams

Frontiers in Psychology 2013 Melanie G. Rosen 58 citations

I propose a narrative fabrication thesis of dream reports, according to which dream reports are often not accurate representations of experiences that occur during sleep. I begin with an overview of anti-experience theses of Norman Malcolm and Daniel Dennett who reject the received view of dreams, that dreams are experiences we have during sleep which are reported upon waking. Although...