ObjectiveTo review the way consciousness is operationalised in contemporary research, discuss strengths and weaknesses of current approaches and propose new measures.MethodWe first reviewed the literature pertaining to the phenomenal character of visual and self‐consciousness as well as awareness of visual stimuli. We also reviewed more problematic cases of dreams and animal consciousness,...
Are dreams bizarre, nonsensical experiences or real-world simulations? I introduce a pluralist approach to dream content that highlights the philosophical and empirical implications of treating dreaming as a highly varied experience that can be anywhere on a spectrum from truly bizarre and incoherent to wake-like and mundane. Here I discuss several explanations for why theorists disagree on...
When we dream, it is often assumed, we are isolated from the external environment. It is also commonly believed that dreams can be, at times, accurate, convincing replicas of waking experience. Here I analyse some of the implications of this view for an enactive theory of conscious experience. If dreams are, as described by the received view, “inactive”, or “cranially envatted” whilst...
To what extent do I have a sense of agency over my thoughts while I dream? The sense of agency in dreams can alter in a variety of interesting ways distinct from normal, waking experience. In fact, dreams show many similarities to the experiences of individuals with schizophrenia. In this paper I analyze these alterations with a focus on distinguishing between reduced sense of agency and other...
Abstract Integrative and naturalistic philosophy of mind can both learn from and contribute to the contemporary cognitive sciences of dreaming. Two related phenomena concerning self‐representation in dreams demonstrate the need to bring disparate fields together. In most dreams, the protagonist or dream self who experiences and actively participates in dream events is or represents the dreamer:...
I propose a narrative fabrication thesis of dream reports, according to which dream reports are often not accurate representations of experiences that occur during sleep. I begin with an overview of anti-experience theses of Norman Malcolm and Daniel Dennett who reject the received view of dreams, that dreams are experiences we have during sleep which are reported upon waking. Although...