Philosophy Compass
2011
Corey W. Dyck
Abstract In attempts to come to grips with Kant’s thought, the influence of the philosophy of Christian Wolff (1679–1754) is often neglected. In this paper, I consider three topics related to Kant’s philosophy of mind, broadly construed, where Wolff’s influence is particularly visible, namely, consciousness, self‐consciousness, and the doctrine of the soul or psychology. I argue that within...
Philosophy Compass
December 1, 2010
Clare Batty
34 citations
Abstract The philosophy of perception has been dominated by vision, with very little discussion of the chemical senses – olfaction and gustation. In this second entry of a pair on olfactory experience, I consider what olfaction has to tell us about two issues: (i) the nature of perceptual objects and (ii) the nature of perceptual properties and, in particular, the secondary qualities. Given the...
Philosophy Compass
October 1, 2010
Amy Kind
Abstract Over the past few decades, as philosophers of mind have begun to rethink the sharp divide that was traditionally drawn between the phenomenal character of an experience (what it’s like to have that experience) and its intentional content (what it represents), representationalist theories of consciousness have become increasingly popular. On this view, phenomenal character is reduced to...
Philosophy Compass
July 20, 2010
Justin Sytsma
39 citations
Abstract In studying folk psychology, cognitive and developmental psychologists have mainly focused on how people conceive of non‐experiential states, such as beliefs and desires. As a result, we know very little about how the non‐philosophers (or the folk) understand the mental states that philosophers typically classify as being phenomenally conscious. In particular, it is not known whether...
Philosophy Compass
July 1, 2009
Taylor Carman
Abstract This article offers an overview of the structure and significance of Merleau‐Ponty's phenomenology. Neither a psychological nor an epistemological theory, Merleau‐Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception is instead an attempt to describe perceptual experience as we experience it. Although he was influenced heavily by Husserl, Heidegger, and Gestalt psychology, his work departs significantly...
Philosophy Compass
March 1, 2009
William Uzgalis
Abstract The correspondence between Samuel Clarke and Anthony Collins of 1706–8, while not well known, is a spectacularly good debate between a dualist and a materialist over the possibility of giving a materialist account of consciousness and personal identity. This article puts the Clarke Collins Correspondence in a broader context in which it can be better appreciated, noting that it is...
Philosophy Compass
May 1, 2007
Jakob Hohwy
Abstract The science of consciousness begins with the search for the neural correlates of consciousness. I explain this notion and give examples of research in the field. I then discuss how different conceptions of consciousness may influence the search for the neural correlates. This includes the distinctions between access and phenomenal consciousness, and between conscious states and unified...
Philosophy Compass
March 1, 2007
Larry Shapiro
Abstract Embodied Cognition is an approach to cognition that departs from traditional cognitive science in its reluctance to conceive of cognition as computational and in its emphasis on the significance of an organism's body in how and what the organism thinks. Three lines of embodied cognition research are described and some thoughts on the future of embodied cognition offered.
Philosophy Compass
May 1, 2006
Rebecca Copenhaver
Abstract Thomas Reid’s epistemological ambitions are decisively at the center of his work. However, if we take such ambitions to be the whole story, we are apt to overlook the theory of mind that Reid develops and deploys against the theory of ideas. Reid’s philosophy of mind is sophisticated and strikingly contemporary, and has, until recently, been lost in the shadow of his other...
Philosophy Compass
2006
Uriah Kriegel
Abstract Phenomenal consciousness is the property mental states, events, and processes have when, and only when, there is something it is like for their subject to undergo them, or be in them. What it is like to have a conscious experience is customarily referred to as the experience's phenomenal character . Theories of consciousness attempt to account for this phenomenal character. This...