Irruption Theory: A Novel Conceptualization of the Enactive Account of Motivated Activity.
Entropy (Basel, Switzerland) May 2, 2023 DOI: 10.3390/e25050748 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Proposes that the concept of irruption, operationalized as information-theoretic entropy, allows normativity to have its own efficacy in generating behavior without reducing it to non-normative system-level activity. |
Abstract
Cognitive science is lacking conceptual tools to describe how an agent's motivations, as such, can play a role in the generation of its behavior. The enactive approach has made progress by developing a relaxed naturalism, and by placing normativity at the core of life and mind; all cognitive activity is a kind of motivated activity. It has rejected representational architectures, especially their reification of the role of normativity into localized "value" functions, in favor of accounts that appeal to system-level properties of the organism. However, these accounts push the problem of reification to a higher level of description, given that the efficacy of agent-level normativity is completely identified with the efficacy of non-normative system-level activity, while assuming operational equivalency. To allow normativity to have its own efficacy, a new kind of nonreductive theory is proposed: irruption theory. The concept of irruption is introduced to indirectly operationalize an agent's motivated involvement in its activity, specifically in terms of a corresponding underdetermination of its states by their material basis. This implies that irruptions are associated with increased unpredictability of (neuro)physiological activity, and they should, hence, be quantifiable in terms of information-theoretic entropy. Accordingly, evidence that action, cognition, and consciousness are linked to higher levels of neural entropy can be interpreted as indicating higher levels of motivated agential involvement. Counterintuitively, irruptions do not stand in contrast to adaptive behavior. Rather, as indicated by artificial life models of complex adaptive systems, bursts of arbitrary changes in neural activity can facilitate the self-organization of adaptivity. Irruption theory therefore, makes it intelligible how an agent's motivations, as such, can make effective differences to their behavior, without requiring the agent to be able to directly control their body's neurophysiological processes.
Citations in the library
Cited by 6
- Irruption and Absorption: A 'Black-Box' Framework for How Mind and Matter Make a Difference to Each Other. Entropy (Basel, Switzerland) March 27, 2024
- From autopoiesis to self-optimization: Toward an enactive model of biological regulation bioRxiv Preprint Server February 5, 2023
- The enactive account of motivated activity and the hard problem of efficacy (HPE): Artificial life meets the physics of life May 22, 2023
- Decision-making through irruption theory: how to use and interpret the Haken-Kelso-Bunz model Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences May 14, 2026
- Coupling first-person cognitive research with neurophilosophy and enactivism: An outline of arguments Adaptive Behavior July 19, 2024
and 1 more in the library
Cites 20
- The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition Oxford University Press eBooks September 13, 2018
- The entropic brain: a theory of conscious states informed by neuroimaging research with psychedelic drugs Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 2014
- Radicalizing Enactivism The MIT Press eBooks December 14, 2012
- Increased spontaneous MEG signal diversity for psychoactive doses of ketamine, LSD and psilocybin Scientific Reports April 19, 2017
- Global and local complexity of intracranial EEG decreases during NREM sleep Neuroscience of Consciousness January 27, 2017
and 15 more in the library