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Philosophies

50 papers in the library · 155 citations · publishing 2017-2026

Papers

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The Emergence of Ur-Intentionality: An Ecological Proposal

Philosophies April 25, 2024 M. Heras-Escribano, Daniel Martínez Moreno

Radical enactivism supports radical embodied cognition (REC), which is the idea that basic or fundamental cognition (perception and action) does not need to be understood in representational, contentful terms. REC departs from the idea that the mind can be naturalized through biological functions, but rejects the idea that mental content, which is understood as having a representational nature,...

Pharmaco-Analysis of Psychedelics—Philo-Fictions about New Materialism, Quantum Mechanics, Information Science, and the Philosophy of Immanence

Philosophies December 30, 2023 Stefan Paulus 1 citation

Recent developments regarding the pharmacology of psychoactive substances are significant for treating depressions or opioid addictions. Current theories, hypotheses, and models of drug effects assume a cause–effect narrative, which is based on a stimulus/response mechanism. These narratives prioritize effects rather than conscious experiences. In this sense, drug experiences are quickly...

What I Am and What I Am Not: Destruktion of the Mind–Body Problem

Philosophies December 22, 2023 Javier A. Galadí

The German word destruktion is used here in the sense that philosophy should destroy some ontological concepts and the everyday meanings of certain words. Tradition allows the transmission of knowledge, but it can perpetuate certain prejudices. According to Heidegger, tradition transmits, but it also conceals. Tradition induces self-evidence and prevents us from accessing the origin of...

Artificial Forms of Life

Philosophies October 27, 2023 Sebastian Sunday Grève

The logical problem of artificial intelligence—the question of whether the notion sometimes referred to as ‘strong’ AI is self-contradictory—is, essentially, the question of whether an artificial form of life is possible. This question has an immediately paradoxical character, which can be made explicit if we recast it (in terms that would ordinarily seem to be implied by it) as the question of...

DOI: 10.3390/philosophies8050089 (opens in new tab) Full text (opens in new tab) Artificial intelligence Artificial general intelligence Human–machine interaction Machine consciousness +2

Self-Transcendence and the Pursuit of Happiness

Philosophies October 18, 2023 Andrea Hurst

This philosophical investigation is motivated by the common association between happiness and self-transcendence, and a question posed by Freud: “Why is it so hard for men to be happy?” I consider the answers given in three key texts from the psychoanalytic tradition, Daniel Kahneman’s Thinking, Fast and Slow, Sigmund Freud’s Civilization and its Discontents, and Abraham Maslow’s The Farther...

DOI: 10.3390/philosophies8050098 (opens in new tab) Happiness Transcendence philosophy Self Epistemology +6

Epistemic Challenges in Neurophenomenology: Exploring the Reliability of Knowledge and Its Ontological Implications

Philosophies October 3, 2023 Anna Shutaleva 6 citations

This article investigates the challenges posed by the reliability of knowledge in neurophenomenology and its connection to reality. Neurophenomenological research seeks to understand the intricate relationship between human consciousness, cognition, and the underlying neural processes. However, the subjective nature of conscious experiences presents unique epistemic challenges in determining...

Ethics of Psychedelic Use in Psychiatry and Beyond—Drawing upon Legal, Social and Clinical Challenges

Philosophies August 24, 2023 Nuno Azevedo, Miguel Oliveira Da Silva, Luís Madeira 11 citations

Background: Psychedelics are known for their powerful mental effects due to the activation of 5HT-2A receptors in the brain. During the 1950s and 1960s, research was conducted on these molecules until their criminalization. However, their clinical investigation as therapeutic tools for psychiatric disorders has revived the deontological ethics surrounding this subject. Questions arise as...

Can Computational Intelligence Model Phenomenal Consciousness?

Philosophies July 27, 2023 Eduardo C. Garrido-Merchán, Sara Lumbreras 3 citations

Consciousness and intelligence are properties that can be misunderstood as necessarily dependent. The term artificial intelligence and the kind of problems it managed to solve in recent years has been shown as an argument to establish that machines experience some sort of consciousness. Following Russell’s analogy, if a machine can do what a conscious human being does, the likelihood that the...

Spiritualizing Anarchism, Making Spiritual Practices Anarchistic

Philosophies July 21, 2023 Márk Losoncz 1 citation

This article not only mentions spiritual anarchism nominally, as do so many previous articles, but tries to define it as precisely as possible. The definition assumes that the self itself can be a source of unjustifiable authority and a limitation to freedom, and that spiritual anarchism is nothing more than being open to that which transegoically transcends our narrow perspective. The article...

Building the Blocks of Being: The Attributes and Qualities Required for Consciousness

Philosophies June 22, 2023 Izak Tait, Joshua Bensemann, Trung B. Nguyen

For consciousness to exist, an entity must have prerequisite characteristics and attributes to give rise to it. We explore these “building blocks” of consciousness in detail in this paper, which range from perceptive to computational to meta-representational characteristics of an entity’s cognitive architecture. We show how each cognitive attribute is strictly necessary for the emergence of...

The Digital Mind: How Computers (Re)Structure Human Consciousness

Philosophies January 11, 2023 Brian L. Ott

Technologies of communication condition human sense-making. They do so by creating the social environment we inhabit and extending their structural biases and logics through human use. As such, this essay inquires into the prevailing habits of mind in the digital era. Employing a media ecology of communication, I argue that digital computers and microprocessors are defined by three structural...

Enactivism and Material Culture: How Enactivism Could Redefine Enculturation Processes

Philosophies July 4, 2022 Alvaro David Monterroza-Rios, Carlos Mario Gutiérrez-aguilar 18 citations

Culture has traditionally been considered as a set of knowledge, beliefs, arts, laws, norms, and morals, acquired by a human being as a member of a group. Some anthropologists interpret this as a set of abstract representations, such as information or knowledge, while others interpret it as behavioral control mechanisms. These views assume that the contents of a particular culture must be...

From Turing to Conscious Machines

Philosophies June 23, 2022 Igor Aleksander

In the period between Turing’s 1950 “Computing Machinery and Intelligence” and the current considerable public exposure to the term “artificial intelligence (AI)”, Turing’s question “Can a machine think?” has become a topic of daily debate in the media, the home, and, indeed, the pub. However, “Can a machine think?” is sliding towards a more controversial issue: “Can a machine be conscious?” Of...

DOI: 10.3390/philosophies7030057 (opens in new tab) Full text (opens in new tab) Living consciousness Machine consciousness Thought

Scientific Observation Is Socio-Materially Augmented Perception: Toward a Participatory Realism

Philosophies April 21, 2022 Tom Froese

There is an overlooked similarity between three classic accounts of the conditions of object experience from three distinct disciplines. (1) Sociology: the “inversion” that accompanies discovery in the natural sciences, as local causes of effects are reattributed to an observed object. (2) Psychology: the “externalization” that accompanies mastery of a visual–tactile sensory substitution...

DOI: 10.3390/philosophies7020037 (opens in new tab) Full text (opens in new tab) Mind–body problem Sensory substitution Direct perception Enactive cognition +2

Information in Explaining Cognition: How to Evaluate It?

Philosophies April 21, 2022 Nir Fresco

The claims that “The brain processes information” or “Cognition is information processing” are accepted as truisms in cognitive science. However, it is unclear how to evaluate such claims absent a specification of “information” as it is used by neurocognitive theories. The aim of this article is, thus, to identify the key features of information that information-based neurocognitive theories...

The Phenomenology of “Pure” Consciousness as Reported by an Experienced Meditator of the Tibetan Buddhist Karma Kagyu Tradition. Analysis of Interview Content Concerning Different Meditative States

Philosophies June 17, 2021 Cyril Costines, Tilmann Lhündrup Borghardt, Marc Wittmann 31 citations

A philosopher and a cognitive neuroscientist conversed with Buddhist lama Tilmann Lhündrup Borghardt (TLB) about the unresolved phenomenological concerns and logical questions surrounding “pure” consciousness or minimal phenomenal experience (MPE), a quasi-contentless, non-dual state whose phenomenology of “emptiness” is often described in terms of the phenomenal quality of luminosity that...

Agency, Responsibility, Selves, and the Mechanical Mind

Philosophies January 20, 2021 Fiorella Battaglia

Moral issues arise not only when neural technology directly influences and affects people’s lives, but also when the impact of its interventions indirectly conceptualizes the mind in new, and unexpected ways. It is the case that theories of consciousness, theories of subjectivity, and third person perspective on the brain provide rival perspectives addressing the mind. Through a review of these...

DOI: 10.3390/philosophies6010007 (opens in new tab) Full text (opens in new tab) Brain–computer interface bci Human–robot interaction Mind Sense of agency +1

Embodied AI beyond Embodied Cognition and Enactivism

Philosophies July 16, 2019 Riccardo Manzotti 23 citations

Over the last three decades, the rise of embodied cognition (EC) articulated in various schools (or versions) of embodied, embedded, extended and enacted cognition (Gallagher’s 4E) has offered AI a way out of traditional computationalism—an approach (or an understanding) loosely referred to as embodied AI. This view has split into various branches ranging from a weak form on the brink of...

Nonconscious Cognitive Suffering: Considering Suffering Risks of Embodied Artificial Intelligence

Philosophies May 31, 2019 Steven Umbrello, Stefan Lorenz Sorgner

Strong arguments have been formulated that the computational limits of disembodied artificial intelligence (AI) will, sooner or later, be a problem that needs to be addressed. Similarly, convincing cases for how embodied forms of AI can exceed these limits makes for worthwhile research avenues. This paper discusses how embodied cognition brings with it other forms of information integration and...

DOI: 10.3390/philosophies4020024 (opens in new tab) Full text (opens in new tab) Artificial intelligence Embodiment Nonconscious cognition Applied ethics +1

The Quale of Time

Philosophies April 15, 2019 Cosmin Vișan

Time is one of the greatest subjects of interest to the disciplines of both Science and Philosophy, being seen to have a greater importance in the workings of reality than other entities. In this paper, a phenomenological analysis of time based on the general workings of the emergent structure of consciousness will be done, and time will be shown to be no different than any other qualia. It...

The Problem of Meaning in AI and Robotics: Still with Us after All These Years

Philosophies April 3, 2019 Tom Froese, Shigeru Taguchi 44 citations

In this essay we critically evaluate the progress that has been made in solving the problem of meaning in artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics. We remain skeptical about solutions based on deep neural networks and cognitive robotics, which in our opinion do not fundamentally address the problem. We agree with the enactive approach to cognitive science that things appear as intrinsically...

DOI: 10.3390/philosophies4020014 (opens in new tab) Full text (opens in new tab) Mind-body problem 4e cognition Cognitive robotics Artificial life +4

Enactivism and Robotic Language Acquisition: A Report from the Frontier

Philosophies March 7, 2019 Frank Förster

In this article, I assess an existing language acquisition architecture, which was deployed in linguistically unconstrained human–robot interaction, together with experimental design decisions with regard to their enactivist credentials. Despite initial scepticism with respect to enactivism’s applicability to the social domain, the introduction of the notion of participatory sense-making in the...

The Natural Philosophy of Experiencing

Philosophies November 8, 2018 Robert Prentner

A new philosophy of nature is urgently needed. The received ontological view, physicalism, is unable to account for experiential phenomena and in particular for consciousness in all its varieties. We shall outline the concept of experiencing which should figure as a new conceptual primitive in natural philosophy. Experiencing refers to a process which comprises the interaction of an agent with...

DOI: 10.3390/philosophies3040035 (opens in new tab) Full text (opens in new tab) Natural philosophy Subjective experience Process Dual aspects +3

Consciousness: A Molecular Perspective

Philosophies December 6, 2017 Robert Prentner

This perspective examines the role of chemistry and molecular biology for a science of consciousness. Opposed to the consensus view, we argue that the molecular organization of biological systems is key to arrive at a thorough understanding of the dynamics correlated to the phenomenology of consciousness in complex organisms. This is indicated by the fact that the molecular sciences either...

Exploring the Computational Explanatory Gap

Philosophies January 16, 2017 James A. Reggia, Di-Wei Huang, Garrett E. Katz 8 citations

While substantial progress has been made in the field known as artificial consciousness, at the present time there is no generally accepted phenomenally conscious machine, nor even a clear route to how one might be produced should we decide to try. Here, we take the position that, from our computer science perspective, a major reason for this is a computational explanatory gap: our inability to...