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Consciousness: A Molecular Perspective

Robert Prentner

Philosophies December 6, 2017 DOI: 10.3390/philosophies2040026 (opens in new tab) via DOAJ

Summary

AI-generated from the abstract

Contrary to the prevailing view, the molecular organization of biological systems is essential for understanding the dynamics linked to conscious experience in complex organisms. Molecular sciences can either identify mechanisms directly tied to phenomenology or characterize the dynamics of the underlying substrate. The perspective also addresses substrate-independence in information-processing theories of consciousness and the combination problem in panpsychism, arguing from a molecular standpoint that molecular details are crucial.

Study at a glance

Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Keywords Molecular mechanism Substrate independence Supervenience Information-processing theories
Key finding Argues that molecular organization is key to understanding the dynamics correlated with consciousness, challenging the consensus view.

Abstract

This perspective examines the role of chemistry and molecular biology for a science of consciousness. Opposed to the consensus view, we argue that the molecular organization of biological systems is key to arrive at a thorough understanding of the dynamics correlated to the phenomenology of consciousness in complex organisms. This is indicated by the fact that the molecular sciences either provide one or more mechanisms directly related to phenomenology or otherwise describe the dynamics of the underlying substrate. In addition, we discuss substrate-independence in information-processing theories of consciousness and the issue of combination in panpsychist theories of consciousness, both from the angle of the molecular sciences. In any case, molecular details matter.

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