What I Am and What I Am Not: Destruktion of the Mind–Body Problem

Philosophy should destroy certain inherited ontological concepts and everyday word meanings that tradition transmits but also conceals. Tradition induces self-evidence, blocking access to the origin of concepts and making us believe no return is needed. Making tradition transparent dissolves these concealments. Applied to the mind–body problem, this reveals occultations originating from Descartes himself. A new framework for consciousness research emerges: as an individual cognitive being, one cannot avoid splitting reality into what one is and what one is not, extending this individual duality into a collective, culturally transmitted error.

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Abstract

The German word destruktion is used here in the sense that philosophy should destroy some ontological concepts and the everyday meanings of certain words. Tradition allows the transmission of knowledge, but it can perpetuate certain prejudices. According to Heidegger, tradition transmits, but it also conceals. Tradition induces self-evidence and prevents us from accessing the origin of concepts. It makes us believe that we do not need to return to that origin. Making tradition transparent dissolves the concealments it has provoked. Here, I apply this idea to the mind–body problem, which has inherited occultations that are born from Descartes himself. As a result, a new philosophical framework for research on consciousness emerges: that, as an individual cognitive being, I cannot avoid splitting reality into what I am and what I am not, extending then the individual duality to a collective error transmitted culturally.